追缉：炸弹客第一季

《追缉：炸弹客 Manhunt: Unabomber》（原名《宣言 Manifesto》），根据真实事件改编，是Discovery频道出品的8集FBI罪案调查剧，主要讲述FBI抓捕连环爆炸案罪犯的过程。

FBI探员菲茨是一个不习惯用老方法收集情报的专门语言学家，他用自己非传统的方法让藏匿了近20年的炸弹客被绳之以法。

关于剧情，不多赘述，我只想说一下，剧中两位主角的悲剧人生。

充满着无奈、痛苦、愤恨以及不被认可的病态坚持。

菲茨永远也想不到，一张违停罚单改变了他的人生。

十年前，刚刚加入警察队伍的他给一辆违停的汽车开了一张罚单。

没想到车主蛮有后台，警队领导让菲茨把罚单取消，菲茨没有同意。

就这样，原本很聪明很有前途的菲茨，在偏僻的小城里窝了十年。

由于喜欢推理，他参加FBI的侧写师学习，普遍比其他学员大十多岁，但是他靠天赋和坚韧的性格取得了好成绩。

如果没有天才炸弹客卡辛斯基，菲茨肯定在小城里终老一生，家庭和睦，子女绕膝，享尽天伦之乐。

卡辛斯基和菲茨，相互成就梦想，同时也相互毁灭人生，惺惺相惜，相爱相杀。

菲茨在寻找卡辛斯基的过程，可以说是从青铜到王者的蜕变。

他了解炸弹客就像了解自己一样。

他孤僻暴躁，把人当做工具来利用，需要扔掉的时候便随手扔掉。

曾经跟他一起办案的同事，对他无比信任，冒着违反规定的风险，帮他找到关键线索。

可是菲茨怎么对待她呢？

在和领导汇报案情的时候，毫不顾忌地就把同事供了出去。

同事因为违反规定被辞，临走的时候，他竟然一丢丢的自责都没有，漠然地说了一句：“可是你确实违反了规定啊。

”渣！

另外一个女人，对他的帮助就更大，可以说是他破案过程中的所有理论支撑。

作为语言学专家，无数次帮助菲茨解答疑问，说菲茨盗窃了她的研究成果都不为过。

当得知菲茨和妻子分手后，主动接近他，温暖他，以为他也想和她在一起。

在案情取得重大突破的那天晚上，主动亲了菲茨。

没想到菲茨却异常冷静地推开了她，what？

这是什么操作？

原来美女专家只是他的破案工具，他只爱一个人，就是炸弹客。

渣渣！！

第三个女人就是他的妻子。

原本幸福美满的一家五口，可是因为他对自己梦想的无比坚持而分崩离析。

陪孩子看电影，接到电话就走，孩子在电影院苦等四个多小时。

妻子到单位找到他后，他还以为自己只离开了十分钟。

幻想挽回婚姻的妻子去陪他，他竟然一脸嫌弃，那感觉就是怎么这么碍事。

好吧，你不需要家人，家人也没必要挽留你。

渣渣渣！！！

OK，菲茨废寝忘食地工作，应该会得到同事和领导的认可吧。

然而并不是这样，他在工作中无数次被嘲笑，他的一切成果都被上司夺走，他只能傻傻地看着电视机屏幕里上司洋洋得意的表情，就连逮捕犯人的庆功会都没人通知他一起参加。

他走进庆功会的时候，四处都是人，可他无比孤独。

抓到炸弹客之后，他成了孤家寡人，成了另一个卡辛斯基，过上了隐居的生活。

但是听说炸弹客利用司法漏洞或许脱罪的时候，他又坐不住了。

他利用卡辛斯基的软肋，逼迫其认罪。

最后，卡辛斯基在监狱里度过余生，得以让他的著作被世人认可。

庭审结束，菲茨又路过每次都经过的路口。

路上空荡荡，没有车没有人，偌大的十字路口，只有他一辆汽车，孤独地乖乖地停在红灯前面。

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这部剧根据真实故事改编

卡辛斯基被捕时的警方档案照片以下内容引自于维基百科 生平介绍卡辛斯基是波兰移民的后代，1942年5月22日于美国伊利诺伊州芝加哥出生。

他拥有167的高智商，十六岁时被哈佛大学数学系录取，1962年在哈佛大学毕业后转入密歇根大学攻读数学博士学位，卡辛斯基用了数月时间便完成博士学业，他的指导教授说他的博士论文十分深奥。

全美只有十几个人能看懂，后来辛斯基在该校从事了四年多的学术研究。

二十五岁时被加州大学柏克莱分校聘为助理教授，是该校史上雇用过最年轻的教授，但他对教学并不自在，在两年后辞去。

犯罪背景 卡辛斯基在1978年至1995年间，不断邮寄炸弹给大学教授、大型企业主管及航空公司，造成3人死亡及20多人受伤。

1996年4月3日被逮捕，最后被法院判处无期徒刑。

卡辛斯基的绰号：大学炸弹客／隐形炸弹，The Unabomber（University and Airline Bomber）；是指其为针对大学及航空公司的炸弹客。

卡辛斯基在1969年辞去加州大学柏克莱分校的教授职位，并在1971年到蒙大拿州隐居。

1978年5月25日，卡辛斯基进行第一次有记录犯罪：他送出一枚故意写错地址的邮包炸弹到芝加哥大学，该校工作人员收到“寄错地址”的邮包后，便把邮包退回“寄件人”－美国西北大学工程学教授巴克利·克利斯（Buckley Crist）；卡辛斯基的犯罪对象便是巴克利教授。

巴克利教授收到“退回邮包”后，感到可疑，因此巴克利教授托一名校警代替打开该邮包；邮包炸弹在打开时发生爆炸，校警当场炸至重伤。

事后警方将嫌疑犯锁定为几位学生，卡辛斯基因此并无受警方怀疑。

1979年5月9日，美国航空公司444航班，从芝加哥飞往华盛顿的波音727客机行李舱在飞行时发出巨响，随后冒出浓烟，一名乘客吸入浓烟不适，飞机被迫降落。

警方事后调查行李舱，发现一枚“邮包炸弹”。

由于计时机制出错，因而防止了炸弹爆炸；当局表示，炸弹威力足以毁灭飞机。

截至1995年，卡辛斯基对不同大学及航空公司寄出共16枚炸弹；共炸死3人，炸伤23人。

1995年4月24日，卡辛斯基给美国多间报社及杂志社发了一封信件，并承诺如果“纽约时报”及“华盛顿邮报”刊登他的三万五千字的学术论文－《论工业社会及其未来》（Industrial Society & Its Future），他便会停止持续十八年的连环炸弹案。

美国联邦调查局最终以“阻止炸弹案再次发生”为由，允许刊登其论文。

《论工业社会及其未来》中解释了卡辛斯基的犯罪动机。

他认为工业文明使人类丧失自由，科技发展给人类带来灾难。

因此他针对推动科技发展的科学家和工程师等高技术人才为目标，以科技倒退的形式达成人类自由的解放。

在发表论文后，不少无政府主义者、少数卢德分子[1]及极端主义者转为支持卡辛斯基。

卡辛斯基的论文在报纸上刊登后，他的弟弟－大卫·卡辛斯基发现论文与其兄的写作风格及信仰极为相似；而在论文发表前，大卫的妻子琳达更曾怀疑泰德是“The Unabomber”，促使大卫向美国联邦调查局提供线索，最终泰德·卡辛斯基在1996年落网。

1996年4月，警方以国内恐怖主义，谋杀、使用及制造炸弹等罪名起诉卡辛斯基。

卡辛斯基拒绝了其律师为避免死刑而提出的精神病理由，他亦因此解雇了其法庭指定的律师。

1998年，卡辛斯基主动承认控罪，被判处终身监禁，不得保释。

美国联邦调查局表示，隐形炸弹客案件是FBI历史上最昂贵的调查。

作品不得不说写的挺有道理的 （捂脸）工业社会及其未来（英文版）引自豆瓣用户： 532EEDC9400A0 原文 http://www.douban.com/note/240140425/ PDF http://editions-hache.com/essais/pdf/kaczynski2.pdf EPUB https://archive.org/download/IndustrialSocietyAndItsFuture-TheUnabombersManifesto/IndustrialSocietyAndItsFuture-theUnabombersManifesto.epub 有声书 https://archive.org/stream/IndustrialSocietyAndItsFuture-TheUnabombersManifesto/IndustrialSocietyAndItsFuture-theUnabombersManifesto#page/n1/mode/2up 其他 https://archive.org/details/IndustrialSocietyAndItsFuture-TheUnabombersManifesto回 （中文版） http://www.360doc.com/content/14/0919/15/15347270_410709909.shtml 其他卡辛斯基思想观念是如何形成的，包括CIA是否真的对哈佛大学学生做过心理方面实验，我还没有找到相关新闻，不过在卡辛上大学的那个时间段，CIA确实拿监狱的囚犯做过这种残酷的心理实验。

“And at the center, it's the Pripyat River Valley.”而中间则是普里皮亚季河河谷。

“It's just some linguistics humor ——”只是语言学里的笑话“You konw, the slavic homeland.”斯拉夫人的故乡“You know, it's just this weird, dorky thing.”就是一个古怪无聊的知识“Go on.”继续“Go on, tell me.”继续，告诉我“Ok, so, around the year 600, Slavic people suddenly appeared all over Europe. You know, Germany, Poland, Serbia, Russia. But nobody could figure out where they came from.”公元600年左右，斯拉夫人突然遍布全欧洲。

德国，波兰，塞尔维亚，俄罗斯。

但没人能弄清楚他们来自哪里“The slavic homeland.”斯拉夫人的故乡“Right. It was the huge historical mystery, until they started looking at language, and then they realized that proto-Slavic was missing words for certain kinds of trees. You know, they had to borrow words, for oak and beech and pine and ……”是的，这一直是历史未解之谜，直到他们开始研究语言，然后他们发现原始斯拉夫语中没有几种特定树木的词语，他们得从别的语言借词，来称呼橡树，山毛榉，松树什么的“The nachos are Europe. The slavs are everywhere, but they don't have a word for Jalapeño, so they can't come form here.”玉米片就是欧洲。

欧洲到处是斯拉夫人，但他么没有墨西哥辣椒这个词，所以他们不可能来自那儿Exactly.没错And they have no word for beans, or salsa or sour cream，which eliminates everywhere but here.他们也没有豆子，辣酱，酸奶油这些词。

所以排除了所有地方，除了这里The Pripyat River Valley in Ukraine乌克兰的普里皮亚季河河谷It's basically this huge swamp. The one place in Europe where there are no tree那儿基本就是个大沼泽，是欧洲唯一一处没有树的地方Right是啊It was brilliant because, up until then, they had only been looking at the words that they had, and the key was in the words that they didn't have. What they didn't say这样研究的厉害之处就在于之前他们只分析斯拉夫语中已有的词语，然而关键在于语言中没有的词语。

斯拉夫人不说的东西……what they didn't know how to say他们不知道怎么说的东西—— Manhunt:Unabomber S01EP03

google到的，原文在华盛顿邮报官网。

未及勘误。

原文地址：INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND ITS FUTUREThe Unabomber Trial: The ManifestoEditor's Note: This is the text of a 35,000-word manifesto as submitted to The Washington Post and the New York Times by the serial mail bomber called the Unabomber. The manifesto appeared in The Washington Post as an eight-page supplement that was not part of the news sections. This document contains corrections that appeared in the Friday, Sept. 22, 1995 editions of Washington Post. The text was sent in June, 1995 to The New York Times and The Washington Post by the person who calls himself 揊C,� identified by the FBI as the Unabomber, whom authorities have implicated in three murders and 16 bombings. The author threatened to send a bomb to an unspecified destination 搘ith intent to kill� unless one of the newspapers published this manuscript. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI recommended publication.Return to our special report.INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND ITS FUTUREIntroduction1. The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in 揳dvanced� countries, but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology will worsen the situation. It will certainly subject human beings to greater indignities and inflict greater damage on the natural world, it will probably lead to greater social disruption and psychological suffering, and it may lead to increased physical suffering even in 揳dvanced� countries.2. The industrial-technological system may survive or it may break down. If it survives, it MAY eventually achieve a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after passing through a long and very painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently reducing human beings and many other living organisms to engineered products and mere cogs in the social machine. Furthermore, if the system survives, the consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming or modifying the system so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.3. If the system breaks down the consequences will still be very painful. But the bigger the system grows the more disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to break down it had best break down sooner rather than later.4. We therefore advocate a revolution against the industrial system. This revolution may or may not make use of violence; it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process spanning a few decades. We can抰 predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution against that form of society. This is not to be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not governments but the economic and technological basis of the present society.5. In this article we give attention to only some of the negative developments that have grown out of the industrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention only briefly or ignore altogether. This does not mean that we regard these other developments as unimportant. For practical reasons we have to confine our discussion to areas that have received insufficient public attention or in which we have something new to say. For example, since there are well-developed environmental and wilderness movements, we have written very little about environmental degradation or the destruction of wild nature, even though we consider these to be highly important.THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in a deeply troubled society. One of the most widespread manifestations of the craziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of the psychology of leftism can serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modern society in general.7. But what is leftism? During the first half of the 20th century leftism could have been practically identified with socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not clear who can properly be called a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we have in mind mainly socialists, collectivists, 損olitically correct� types, feminists, gay and disability activists, animal rights activists and the like. But not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is a leftist. What we are trying to get at in discussing leftism is not so much movement or an ideology as a psychological type, or rather a collection of related types. Thus, what we mean by 搇eftism� will emerge more clearly in the course of our discussion of leftist psychology. (Also, see paragraphs 227-230.)8. Even so, our conception of leftism will remain a good deal less clear than we would wish, but there doesn抰 seem to be any remedy for this. All we are trying to do here is indicate in a rough and approximate way the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the main driving force of modern leftism. We by no means claim to be telling the WHOLE truth about leftist psychology. Also, our discussion is meant to apply to modern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to which our discussion could be applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th centuries.9. The two psychological tendencies that underlie modern leftism we call 揻eelings of inferiority� and 搊versocialization.� Feelings of inferiority are characteristic of modern leftism as a whole, while oversocialization is characteristic only of a certain segment of modern leftism; but this segment is highly influential.FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY10. By 揻eelings of inferiority� we mean not only inferiority feelings in the strict sense but a whole spectrum of related traits; low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, depressive tendencies, defeatism, guilt, self- hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have some such feelings (possibly more or less repressed) and that these feelings are decisive in determining the direction of modern leftism.11. When someone interprets as derogatory almost anything that is said about him (or about groups with whom he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low self-esteem. This tendency is pronounced among minority rights activists, whether or not they belong to the minority groups whose rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the words used to designate minorities and about anything that is said concerning minorities. The terms 搉egro,� 搊riental,� 揾andicapped� or 揷hick� for an African, an Asian, a disabled person or a woman originally had no derogatory connotation. 揃road� and 揷hick� were merely the feminine equivalents of 揼uy,� 揹ude� or 揻ellow.� The negative connotations have been attached to these terms by the activists themselves. Some animal rights activists have gone so far as to reject the word 損et� and insist on its replacement by 揳nimal companion.� Leftish anthropologists go to great lengths to avoid saying anything about primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as negative. They want to replace the world 損rimitive� by 搉onliterate.� They seem almost paranoid about anything that might suggest that any primitive culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that primitive cultures ARE inferior to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish anthropologists.)12. Those who are most sensitive about 損olitically incorrect� terminology are not the average black ghetto- dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a minority of activists, many of whom do not even belong to any 搊ppressed� group but come from privileged strata of society. Political correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have secure employment with comfortable salaries, and the majority of whom are heterosexual white males from middle- to upper-middle-class families.13. Many leftists have an intense identification with the problems of groups that have an image of being weak (women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals) or otherwise inferior. The leftists themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They would never admit to themselves that they have such feelings, but it is precisely because they do see these groups as inferior that they identify with their problems. (We do not mean to suggest that women, Indians, etc. ARE inferior; we are only making a point about leftist psychology.)14. Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that women are as strong and as capable as men. Clearly they are nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men.15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image of being strong, good and successful. They hate America, they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they hate rationality. The reasons that leftists give for hating the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with their real motives. They SAY they hate the West because it is warlike, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so forth, but where these same faults appear in socialist countries or in primitive cultures, the leftist finds excuses for them, or at best he GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whereas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out (and often greatly exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western civilization. Thus it is clear that these faults are not the leftist抯 real motive for hating America and the West. He hates America and the West because they are strong and successful.16. Words like 搒elf-confidence,� 搒elf-reliance,� 搃nitiative,� 揺nterprise,� 搊ptimism,� etc., play little role in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, pro-collectivist. He wants society to solve everyone抯 problems for them, satisfy everyone抯 needs for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of person who has an inner sense of confidence in his ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own needs. The leftist is antagonistic to the concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels like a loser.17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftish intellectuals tend to focus on sordidness, defeat and despair, or else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there were no hope of accomplishing anything through rational calculation and all that was left was to immerse oneself in the sensations of the moment.18. Modern leftish philosophers tend to dismiss reason, science, objective reality and to insist that everything is culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious questions about the foundations of scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of objective reality can be defined. But it is obvious that modern leftish philosophers are not simply cool-headed logicians systematically analyzing the foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their attack on truth and reality. They attack these concepts because of their own psychological needs. For one thing, their attack is an outlet for hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive for power. More importantly, the leftist hates science and rationality because they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and other beliefs as false (i.e., failed, inferior). The leftist抯 feelings of inferiority run so deep that he cannot tolerate any classification of some things as successful or superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also underlies the rejection by many leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of IQ tests. Leftists are antagonistic to genetic explanations of human abilities or behavior because such explanations tend to make some persons appear superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit or blame for an individual抯 ability or lack of it. Thus if a person is 搃nferior� it is not his fault, but society抯, because he has not been brought up properly.19. The leftist is not typically the kind of person whose feelings of inferiority make him a braggart, an egotist, a bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of person has not wholly lost faith in himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can still conceive of himself as having the capacity to be strong, and his efforts to make himself strong produce his unpleasant behavior. [1] But the leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so ingrained that he cannot conceive of himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence the collectivism of the leftist. He can feel strong only as a member of a large organization or a mass movement with which he identifies himself.20. Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics. Leftists protest by lying down in front of vehicles, they intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These tactics may often be effective, but many leftists use them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER masochistic tactics. Self-hatred is a leftist trait.21. Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated by compassion or by moral principles, and moral principle does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But compassion and moral principle cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent a component of leftist behavior; so is the drive for power. Moreover, much leftist behavior is not rationally calculated to be of benefit to the people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one believes that affirmative action is good for black people, does it make sense to demand affirmative action in hostile or dogmatic terms? Obviously it would be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory approach that would make at least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not take such an approach because it would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black people is not their real goal. Instead, race problems serve as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated need for power. In doing so they actually harm black people, because the activists� hostile attitude toward the white majority tends to intensify race hatred.22. If our society had no social problems at all, the leftists would have to INVENT problems in order to provide themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend to be an accurate description of everyone who might be considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general tendency of leftism.OVERSOCIALIZATION24. Psychologists use the term 搒ocialization� to designate the process by which children are trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are oversocialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.25. The moral code of our society is so demanding that no one can think, feel and act in a completely moral way. For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet almost everyone hates somebody at some time or other, whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are so highly socialized that the attempt to think, feel and act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order to avoid feelings of guilt, they continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find moral explanations for feelings and actions that in reality have a non-moral origin. We use the term 搊versocialized� to describe such people. [2]26. Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a sense of powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of the most important means by which our society socializes children is by making them feel ashamed of behavior or speech that is contrary to society抯 expectations. If this is overdone, or if a particular child is especially susceptible to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of HIMSELF. Moreover the thought and the behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by society抯 expectations than are those of the lightly socialized person. The majority of people engage in a significant amount of naughty behavior. They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off at work, they hate someone, they say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get ahead of the other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if he does do them he generates in himself a sense of shame and self-hatred. The oversocialized person cannot even experience, without guilt, thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot think 搖nclean� thoughts. And socialization is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to conform to many norms of behavior that do not fall under the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person is kept on a psychological leash and spends his life running on rails that society has laid down for him. In many oversocialized people this results in a sense of constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe hardship. We suggest that oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings inflict on one another.27. We argue that a very important and influential segment of the modern left is oversocialized and that their oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction of modern leftism. Leftists of the oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the upper-middle class. Notice that university intellectuals [3] constitute the most highly socialized segment of our society and also the most left-wing segment.28. The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most basic values of society. Generally speaking, the goals of today抯 leftists are NOT in conflict with the accepted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses mainstream society of violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, helping poor people, peace as opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to animals. More fundamentally, the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. All these have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle and upper classes [4] for a long time. These values are explicitly or implicitly expressed or presupposed in most of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and the educational system. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel against these principles but justify their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that society is not living up to these principles.29. Here is an illustration of the way in which the oversocialized leftist shows his real attachment to the conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion against it. Many leftists push for affirmative action, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for improved education in black schools and more money for such schools; the way of life of the black 搖nderclass� they regard as a social disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system, make him a business executive, a lawyer, a scientist just like upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will reply that the last thing they want is to make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they want to preserve African American culture. But in what does this preservation of African American culture consist? It can hardly consist in anything more than eating black-style food, listening to black-style music, wearing black-style clothing and going to a black- style church or mosque. In other words, it can express itself only in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects most leftists of the oversocialized type want to make the black man conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him study technical subjects, become an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to prove that black people are as good as white. They want to make black fathers 搑esponsible,� they want black gangs to become nonviolent, etc. But these are exactly the values of the industrial-technological system. The system couldn抰 care less what kind of music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what religion he believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a respectable job, climbs the status ladder, is a 搑esponsible� parent, is nonviolent and so forth. In effect, however much he may deny it, the oversocialized leftist wants to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt its values.30. We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the oversocialized type, NEVER rebel against the fundamental values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some oversocialized leftists have gone so far as to rebel against one of modern society抯 most important principles by engaging in physical violence. By their own account, violence is for them a form of 搇iberation.� In other words, by committing violence they break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into them. Because they are oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for them than for others; hence their need to break free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion in terms of mainstream values. If they engage in violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.31. We realize that many objections could be raised to the foregoing thumbnail sketch of leftist psychology. The real situation is complex, and anything like a complete description of it would take several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to have indicated very roughly the two most important tendencies in the psychology of modern leftism.32. The problems of the leftist are indicative of the problems of our society as a whole. Low self-esteem, depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though they are especially noticeable in the left, they are widespread in our society. And today抯 society tries to socialize us to a greater extent than any previous society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to exercise, how to make love, how to raise our kids and so forth.THE POWER PROCESS33. Human beings have a need (probably based in biology) for something that we will call the 損ower process.� This is closely related to the need for power (which is widely recognized) but is not quite the same thing. The power process has four elements. The three most clear-cut of these we call goal, effort and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment requires effort, and needs to succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is more difficult to define and may not be necessary for everyone. We call it autonomy and will discuss it later (paragraphs 42-44).34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can have anything he wants just by wishing for it. Such a man has power, but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first he will have a lot of fun, but by and by he will become acutely bored and demoralized. Eventually he may become clinically depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies tend to become decadent. This is not true of fighting aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, secure aristocracies that have no need to exert themselves usually become bored, hedonistic and demoralized, even though they have power. This shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward which to exercise one抯 power.35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the physical necessities of life: food, water and whatever clothing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured aristocrat obtains these things without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.36. Nonattainment of important goals results in death if the goals are physical necessities, and in frustration if nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent failure to attain goals throughout life results in defeatism, low self-esteem or depression.37, Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being needs goals whose attainment requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining his goals.SURROGATE ACTIVITIES38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and demoralized. For example, the emperor Hirohito, instead of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine biology, a field in which he became distinguished. When people do not have to exert themselves to satisfy their physical needs they often set up artificial goals for themselves. In many cases they then pursue these goals with the same energy and emotional involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search for physical necessities. Thus the aristocrats of the Roman Empire had their literary pretensions; many European aristocrats a few centuries ago invested tremendous time and energy in hunting, though they certainly didn抰 need the meat; other aristocracies have competed for status through elaborate displays of wealth; and a few aristocrats, like Hirohito, have turned to science.39. We use the term 搒urrogate activity� to designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work toward, or let us say, merely for the sake of the 揻ulfillment� that they get from pursuing the goal. Here is a rule of thumb for the identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much time and energy to the pursuit of goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote most of his time and energy to satisfying his biological needs, and if that effort required him to use his physical and mental faculties in a varied and interesting way, would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain goal X? If the answer is no, then the person抯 pursuit of goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito抯 studies in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity, since it is pretty certain that if Hirohito had had to spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to obtain the necessities of life, he would not have felt deprived because he didn抰 know all about the anatomy and life-cycles of marine animals. On the other hand the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not a surrogate activity, because most people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would feel deprived if they passed their lives without ever having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex. (But pursuit of an excessive amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.)40. In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to satisfy one抯 physical needs. It is enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical skill, then come to work on time and exert the very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements are a moderate amount of intelligence and, most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave. (Yes, there is an underclass that cannot take the physical necessities for granted, but we are speaking here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern society is full of surrogate activities. These include scientific work, athletic achievement, humanitarian work, artistic and literary creation, climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical satisfaction, and social activism when it addresses issues that are not important for the activist personally, as in the case of white activists who work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always PURE surrogate activities, since for many people they may be motivated in part by needs other than the need to have some goal to pursue. Scientific work may be motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by a need to express feelings, militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them, these activities are in large part surrogate activities. For example, the majority of scientists will probably agree that the 揻ulfillment� they get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they earn.41. For many if not most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying than the pursuit of real goals (that is, goals that people would want to attain even if their need for the power process were already fulfilled). One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who are deeply involved in surrogate activities are never satisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker constantly strives for more and more wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the next. The long-distance runner drives himself to run always farther and faster. Many people who pursue surrogate activities will say that they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from the 搈undane� business of satisfying their biological needs, but that is because in our society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More importantly, in our society people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate activities.AUTONOMY42. Autonomy as a part of the power process may not be necessary for every individual. But most people need a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. Their efforts must be undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction and control. Yet most people do not have to exert this initiative, direction and control as single individuals. It is usually enough to act as a member of a SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among themselves and make a successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power process will be served. But if they work under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for autonomous decision and initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served. The same is true when decisions are made on a collective basis if the group making the collective decision is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant. [5]43. It is true that some individuals seem to have little need for autonomy. Either their drive for power is weak or they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful organization to which they belong. And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be satisfied with a purely physical sense of power (the good combat soldier, who gets his sense of power by developing fighting skills that he is quite content to use in blind obedience to his superiors).44. But for most people it is through the power process梙aving a goal, making an AUTONOMOUS effort and attaining the goal梩hat self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of power are acquired. When one does not have adequate opportunity to go through the power process the consequences are (depending on the individual and on the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, hostility, spouse or child abuse, insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating disorders, etc. [6]SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS45. Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur in any society, but in modern industrial society they are present on a massive scale. We aren抰 the first to mention that the world today seems to be going crazy. This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good reason to believe that primitive man suffered from less stress and frustration and was better satisfied with his way of life than modern man is. It is true that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse of women was common among the Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among some of the American Indian tribes. But it does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the kinds of problems that we have listed in the preceding paragraph were far less common among primitive peoples than they are in modern society.46. We attribute the social and psychological problems of modern society to the fact that that society requires people to live under conditions radically different from those under which the human race evolved and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that the human race developed while living under the earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already written that we consider lack of opportunity to properly experience the power process as the most important of the abnormal conditions to which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one. Before dealing with disruption of the power process as a source of social problems we will discuss some of the other sources.47. Among the abnormal conditions present in modern industrial society are excessive density of population, isolation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social change and the breakdown of natural small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the tribe.48. It is well known that crowding increases stress and aggression. The degree of crowding that exists today and the isolation of man from nature are consequences of technological progress. All pre-industrial societies were predominantly rural. The Industrial Revolution vastly increased the size of cities and the proportion of the population that lives in them, and modern agricultural technology has made it possible for the Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. (Also, technology exacerbates the effects of crowding because it puts increased disruptive powers in people抯 hands. For example, a variety of noise- making devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of these devices is unrestricted, people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise. If their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by the regulations. But if these machines had never been invented there would have been no conflict and no frustration generated by them.)49. For primitive societies the natural world (which usually changes only slowly) provided a stable framework and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it is human society that dominates nature rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very rapidly owing to technological change. Thus there is no stable framework.50. The conservatives are fools: They whine about the decay of traditional values, yet they enthusiastically support technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never occurs to them that you can抰 make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a society without causing rapid changes in all other aspects of the society as well, and that such rapid changes inevitably break down traditional values.51. The breakdown of traditional values to some extent implies the breakdown of the bonds that hold together traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration of small-scale social groups is also promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt individuals to move to new locations, separating themselves from their communities. Beyond that, a technological society HAS TO weaken family ties and local communities if it is to function efficiently. In modern society an individual抯 loyalty must be first to the system and only secondarily to a small-scale community, because if the internal loyalties of small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty to the system, such communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system.52. Suppose that a public official or a corporation executive appoints his cousin, his friend or his co- religionist to a position rather than appointing the person best qualified for the job. He has permitted personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is 搉epotism� or 揹iscrimination,� both of which are terrible sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies that have done a poor job of subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are usually very inefficient. (Look at Latin America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can tolerate only those small-scale communities that are emasculated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of communities have been widely recognized as sources of social problems. But we do not believe they are enough to account for the extent of the problems that are seen today.54. A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crowded, yet their inhabitants do not seem to have suffered from psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In America today there still are uncrowded rural areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban areas, though the problems tend to be less acute in the rural areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the decisive factor.55. On the growing edge of the American frontier during the 19th century, the mobility of the population probably broke down extended families and small-scale social groups to at least the same extent as these are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by choice in such isolation, having no neighbors within several miles, that they belonged to no community at all, yet they do not seem to have developed problems as a result.56. Furthermore, change in American frontier society was very rapid and deep. A man might be born and raised in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and fed largely on wild meat; and by the time he arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in an ordered community with effective law enforcement. This was a deeper change than that which typically occurs in the life of a modern individual, yet it does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In fact, 19th century American society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that of today抯 society. [8]57. The difference, we argue, is that modern man has the sense (largely justified) that change is IMPOSED on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely justified) that he created change himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of his own choosing and made it into a farm through his own effort. In those days an entire county might have only a couple of hundred inhabitants and was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern county is. Hence the pioneer farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the creation of a new, ordered community. One may well question whether the creation of this community was an improvement, but at any rate it satisfied the pioneer抯 need for the power process.58. It would be possible to give other examples of societies in which there has been rapid change and/or lack of close community ties without the kind of massive behavioral aberration that is seen in today抯 industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social and psychological problems in modern society is the fact that people have insufficient opportunity to go through the power process in a normal way. We don抰 mean to say that modern society is the only one in which the power process has been disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have interfered with the power process to a greater or lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the problem has become particularly acute. Leftism, at least in its recent (mid- to late-20th century) form, is in part a symptom of deprivation with respect to the power process.DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY59. We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those drives that can be satisfied with minimal effort; (2) those that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) those that cannot be adequately satisfied no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is the process of satisfying the drives of the second group. The more drives there are in the third group, the more there is frustration, anger, eventually defeatism, depression, etc.60. In modern industrial society natural human drives tend to be pushed into the first and third groups, and the second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created drives.61. In primitive societies, physical necessities generally fall into group 2: They can be obtained, but only at the cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the physical necessities to everyone [9] in exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed into group 1. (There may be disagreement about whether the effort needed to hold a job is 搈inimal�; but usually, in lower- to middle- level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of OBEDIENCE. You sit or stand where you are told to sit or stand and do what you are told to do in the way you are told to do it. Seldom do you have to exert yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, so that the need for the power process is not well served.)62. Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often remain in group 2 in modern society, depending on the situation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a particularly strong drive for status, the effort required to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy adequately the need for the power process.63. So certain artificial needs have been created that fall into group 2, hence serve the need for the power process. Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make many people feel they need things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It requires serious effort to earn enough money to satisfy these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern man must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of the artificial needs created by the advertising and marketing industry [11], and through surrogate activities.64. It seems that for many people, maybe the majority, these artificial forms of the power process are insufficient. A theme that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social critics of the second half of the 20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in modern society. (This purposelessness is often called by other names such as 揳nomic� or 搈iddle-class vacuity.�) We suggest that the so-called 搃dentity crisis� is actually a search for a sense of purpose, often for commitment to a suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism is in large part a response to the purposelessness of modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for 揻ulfillment.� But we think that for the majority of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment (that is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satisfactory fulfillment. In other words, it does not fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need can be fully satisfied only through activities that have some external goal, such as physical necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning money, climbing the status ladder or functioning as part of the system in some other way, most people are not in a position to pursue their goals AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else抯 employee and, as we pointed out in paragraph 61, must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way they are told to do it. Even people who are in business for themselves have only limited autonomy. It is a chronic complaint of small-business persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government regulation. Some of these regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part government regulations are essential and inevitable parts of our extremely complex society. A large portion of small business today operates on the franchise system. It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that many of the franchise-granting companies require applicants for franchises to take a personality test that is designed to EXCLUDE those who have creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile to go along obediently with the franchise system. This excludes from small business many of the people who most need autonomy.66. Today people live more by virtue of what the system does FOR them or TO them than by virtue of what they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more and more along channels laid down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system provides, the opportunities must be exploited in accord with rules and regulations [13], and techniques prescribed by experts must be followed if there is to be a chance of success.67. Thus the power process is disrupted in our society through a deficiency of real goals and a deficiency of autonomy in the pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those human drives that fall into group 3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how much effort one makes. One of these drives is the need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by other people; we have no control over these decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. (揥e live in a world in which relatively few people梞aybe 500 or 1,000梞ake the important decisions敆Philip B. Heymann of Harvard Law School, quoted by Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our lives depend on whether safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained; on how much pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution into our air; on how skillful (or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job may depend on decisions made by government economists or corporation executives; and so forth. Most individuals are not in a position to secure themselves against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The individual抯 search for security is therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of powerlessness.68. It may be objected that primitive man is physically less secure than modern man, as is shown by his shorter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than the amount of insecurity that is normal for human beings. But psychological security does not closely correspond with physical security. What makes us FEEL secure is not so much objective security as a sense of confidence in our ability to take care of ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by hunger, can fight in self-defense or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in these efforts, but he is by no means helpless against the things that threaten him. The modern individual on the other hand is threatened by many things against which he is helpless: nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, increasing taxes, invasion of his privacy by large organizations, nationwide social or economic phenomena that may disrupt his way of life.69. It is true that primitive man is powerless against some of the things that threaten him; disease for example. But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the nature of things, it is no one抯 fault, unless it is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the modern individual tend to be MAN-MADE. They are not the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by other persons whose decisions he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he feels frustrated, humiliated and angry.70. Thus primitive man for the most part has his security in his own hands (either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands of persons or organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able personally to influence them. So modern man抯 drive for security tends to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas (food, shelter etc.) his security is assured at the cost of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he CANNOT attain security. (The foregoing greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a rough, general way how the condition of modern man differs from that of primitive man.)71. People have many transitory drives or impulses that are necessarily frustrated in modern life, hence fall into group 3. One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit fighting. In many situations it does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one may be in a hurry, or one may be in a mood to travel slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with the flow of traffic and obey the traffic signals. One may want to do one抯 work in a different way, but usually one can work only according to the rules laid down by one抯 employer. In many other ways as well, modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations (explicit or implicit) that frustrate many of his impulses and thus interfere with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be dispensed with, because they are necessary for the functioning of industrial society.72. Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can believe in any religion we like (as long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We can go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice 搒afe sex�). We can do anything we like as long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our behavior.73. Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by the government. Control is often exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or manipulation, and by organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most large organizations use some form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not limited to 揷ommercials� and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously intended as propaganda by the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment programming is a powerful form of propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we have to go to work every day and follow our employer抯 orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people or from going into business for ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and there is room in the economy for only a limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only as someone else抯 employee.74. We suggest that modern man抯 obsession with longevity, and with maintaining physical vigor and sexual attractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment resulting from deprivation with respect to the power process. The 搈id-life crisis� also is such a symptom. So is the lack of interest in having children that is fairly common in modern society but almost unheard-of in primitive societies.75. In primitive societies life is a succession of stages. The needs and purposes of one stage having been fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next stage. A young man goes through the power process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for fulfillment but to get meat that is necessary for food. (In young women the process is more complex, with greater emphasis on social power; we won抰 discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed through, the young man has no reluctance about settling down to the responsibilities of raising a family. (In contrast, some modern people indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking some kind of 揻ulfillment.� We suggest that the fulfillment they need is adequate experience of the power process梬ith real goals instead of the artificial goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised his children, going through the power process by providing them with the physical necessities, the primitive man feels that his work is done and he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many modern people, on the other hand, are disturbed by the prospect of physical deterioration and death, as is shown by the amount of effort they expend trying to maintain their physical condition, appearance and health. We argue that this is due to unfulfillment resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to any practical use, have never gone through the power process using their bodies in a serious way. It is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical purposes, who fears the deterioration of age, but the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his body beyond walking from his car to his house. It is the man whose need for the power process has been satisfied during his life who is best prepared to accept the end of that life.76. In response to the arguments of this section someone will say, 揝ociety must find a way to give people the opportunity to go through the power process.� For such people the value of the opportunity is destroyed by the very fact that society gives it to them. What they need is to find or make their own opportunities. As long as the system GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a leash. To attain autonomy they must get off that leash.HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST77. Not everyone in industrial-technological society suffers from psychological problems. Some people even profess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss some of the reasons why people differ so greatly in their response to modern society.78. First, there doubtless are differences in the strength of the drive for power. Individuals with a weak drive for power may have relatively little need to go through the power process, or at least relatively little need for autonomy in the power process. These are docile types who would have been happy as plantation darkies in the Old South. (We don抰 mean to sneer at the 損lantation darkies� of the Old South. To their credit, most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at people who ARE content with servitude.)79. Some people may have some exceptional drive, in pursuing which they satisfy their need for the power process. For example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social status may spend their whole lives climbing the status ladder without ever getting bored with that game.80. People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques. Some are so susceptible that, even if they make a great deal of money, they cannot satisfy their constant craving for the the shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So they always feel hard-pressed financially even if their income is large, and their cravings are frustrated.81. Some people have low susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques. These are the people who aren抰 interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their need for the power process.82. People who have medium susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques are able to earn enough money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but only at the cost of serious effort (putting in overtime, taking a second job, earning promotions, etc.). Thus material acquisition serves their need for the power process. But it does not necessarily follow that their need is fully satisfied. They may have insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of following orders) and some of their drives may be frustrated (e.g., security, aggression). (We are guilty of oversimplification in paragraphs 80- 82 because we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is entirely a creation of the advertising and marketing industry. Of course it抯 not that simple. [11]83. Some people partly satisfy their need for power by identifying themselves with a powerful organization or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or an organization, adopts its goals as his own, then works toward those goals. When some of the goals are attained, the individual, even though his personal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the attainment of the goals, feels (through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had gone through the power process. This phenomenon was exploited by the fascists, nazis and communists. Our society uses it too, though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the U.S. (goal: punish Noriega). The U.S. invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attainment of goal). Thus the U.S. went through the power process and many Americans, because of their identification with the U.S., experienced the power process vicariously. Hence the widespread public approval of the Panama invasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the same phenomenon in armies, corporations, political parties, humanitarian organizations, religious or ideological movements. In particular, leftist movements tend to attract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for power. But for most people identification with a large organization or a mass movement does not fully satisfy the need for power.84. Another way in which people satisfy their need for the power process is through surrogate activities. As we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity is an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that the individual pursues for the sake of the 揻ulfillment� that he gets from pursuing the goal, not because he needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is no practical motive for building enormous muscles, hitting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage stamps. Yet many people in our society devote themselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or stamp-collecting. Some people are more 搊ther-directed� than others, and therefore will more readily attach importance to a surrogate activity simply because the people around them treat it as important or because society tells them it is important. That is why some people get very serious about essentially trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly pursuits, whereas others who are more clear-sighted never see these things as anything but the surrogate activities that they are, and consequently never attach enough importance to them to satisfy their need for the power process in that way. It only remains to point out that in many cases a person抯 way of earning a living is also a surrogate activity. Not a PURE surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the activity is to gain the physical necessities and (for some people) social status and the luxuries that advertising makes them want. But many people put into their work far more effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status they require, and this extra effort constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together with the emotional investment that accompanies it, is one of the most potent forces acting toward the continual development and perfecting of the system, with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131). Especially, for the most creative scientists and engineers, work tends to be largely a surrogate activity. This point is so important that it deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs 87-92).85. In this section we have explained how many people in modern society do satisfy their need for the power process to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the majority of people the need for the power process is not fully satisfied. In the first place, those who have an insatiable drive for status, or who get firmly 揾ooked� on a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly enough with a movement or organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional personalities. Others are not fully satisfied with surrogate activities or by identification with an organization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the second place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit regulation or through socialization, which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustration due to the impossibility of attaining certain goals and the necessity of restraining too many impulses.86. But even if most people in industrial-technological society were well satisfied, we (FC) would still be opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider it demeaning to fulfill one抯 need for the power process through surrogate activities or through identification with an organization, rather than through pursuit of real goals.THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS87. Science and technology provide the most important examples of surrogate activities. Some scientists claim that they are motivated by 揷uriosity� or by a desire to 揵enefit humanity.� But it is easy to see that neither of these can be the principal motive of most scientists. As for 揷uriosity,� that notion is simply absurd. Most scientists work on highly specialized problems that are not the object of any normal curiosity. For example, is an astronomer, a mathematician or an entomologist curious about the properties of isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course not. Only a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about it only because chemistry is his surrogate activity. Is the chemist curious about the appropriate classification of a new species of beetle? No. That question is of interest only to the entomologist, and he is interested in it only because entomology is his surrogate activity. If the chemist and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to obtain the physical necessities, and if that effort exercised their abilities in an interesting way but in some nonscientific pursuit, then they wouldn抰 give a damn about isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification of beetles. Suppose that lack of funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist to become an insurance broker instead of a chemist. In that case he would have been very interested in insurance matters but would have cared nothing about isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to put into the satisfaction of mere curiosity the amount of time and effort that scientists put into their work. The 揷uriosity� explanation for the scientists� motive just doesn抰 stand up.88. The 揵enefit of humanity� explanation doesn抰 work any better. Some scientific work has no conceivable relation to the welfare of the human race梞ost of archaeology or comparative linguistics for example. Some other areas of science present obviously dangerous possibilities. Yet scientists in these areas are just as enthusiastic about their work as those who develop vaccines or study air pollution. Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional involvement in promoting nuclear power plants. Did this involvement stem from a desire to benefit humanity? If so, then why didn抰 Dr. Teller get emotional about other 揾umanitarian� causes? If he was such a humanitarian then why did he help to develop the H- bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, it is very much open to question whether nuclear power plants actually do benefit humanity. Does the cheap electricity outweigh the accumulating waste and the risk of accidents? Dr. Teller saw only one side of the question. Clearly his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose not from a desire to 揵enefit humanity� but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from seeing it put to practical use.89. The same is true of scientists generally. With possible rare exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power process: to have a goal (a scientific problem to solve), to make an effort (research) and to attain the goal (solution of the problem.) Science is a surrogate activity because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment they get out of the work itself.90. Of course, it抯 not that simple. Other motives do play a role for many scientists. Money and status for example. Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable drive for status (see paragraph 79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt the majority of scientists, like the majority of the general population, are more or less susceptible to advertising and marketing techniques and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus science is not a PURE surrogate activity. But it is in large part a surrogate activity.91. Also, science and technology constitute a power mass movement, and many scientists gratify their need for power through identification with this mass movement (see paragraph 83).92. Thus science marches on blindly, without regard to the real welfare of the human race or to any other standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of the government officials and corporation executives who provide the funds for research.THE NATURE OF FREEDOM93. We are going to argue that industrial-technological society cannot be reformed in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But, because 揻reedom� is a word that can be interpreted in many ways, we must first make clear what kind of freedom we are concerned with.94. By 揻reedom� we mean the opportunity to go through the power process, with real goals not the artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, manipulation or supervision from anyone, especially from any large organization. Freedom means being in control (either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group) of the life-and-death issues of one抯 existence; food, clothing, shelter and defense against whatever threats there may be in one抯 environment. Freedom means having power; not the power to control other people but the power to control the circumstances of one抯 own life. One does not have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organization) has power over one, no matter how benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permissiveness (see paragraph 72).95. It is said that we live in a free society because we have a certain number of constitutionally guaranteed rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal freedom that exists in a society is determined more by the economic and technological structure of the society than by its laws or its form of government. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England were monarchies, and many of the cities of the Italian Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading about these societies one gets the impression that they allowed far more personal freedom than our society does. In part this was because they lacked efficient mechanisms for enforcing the ruler抯 will: There were no modern, well-organized police forces, no rapid long-distance communications, no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of information about the lives of average citizens. Hence it was relatively easy to evade control.96. As for our constitutional rights, consider for example that of freedom of the press. We certainly don抰 mean to knock that right; it is very important tool for limiting concentration of political power and for keeping those who do have political power in line by publicly exposing any misbehavior on their part. But freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual. The mass media are mostly under the control of large organizations that are integrated into the system. Anyone who has a little money can have something printed, or can distribute it on the Internet or in some such way, but what he has to say will be swamped by the vast volume of material put out by the media, hence it will have no practical effect. To make an impression on society with words is therefore almost impossible for most individuals and small groups. Take us (FC) for example. If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they had been been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because it抯 more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we抳e had to kill people.97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but they do not serve to guarantee much more than what might be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the bourgeois conception, a 揻ree� man is essentially an element of a social machine and has only a certain set of prescribed and delimited freedoms; freedoms that are designed to serve the needs of the social machine more than those of the individual. Thus the bourgeois抯 揻ree� man has economic freedom because that promotes growth and progress; he has freedom of the press because public criticism restrains misbehavior by political leaders; he has a right to a fair trial because imprisonment at the whim of the powerful would be bad for the system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar. To him, people deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress (progress as conceived by the bourgeois). Other bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom as a mere means to collective ends. Chester C. Tan, 揅hinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century,� page 202, explains the philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: 揂n individual is granted rights because he is a member of society and his community life requires such rights. By community Hu meant the whole society of the nation.� And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum Chang (Chang Chun-mai, head of the State Socialist Party in China) freedom had to be used in the interest of the state and of the people as a whole. But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it only as someone else prescribes? FC抯 conception of freedom is not that of Bolivar, Hu, Chang or other bourgeois theorists. The trouble with such theorists is that they have made the development and application of social theories their surrogate activity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the needs of the theorists more than the needs of any people who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which the theories are imposed.98. One more point to be made in this section: It should not be assumed that a person has enough freedom just because he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by psychological controls of which people are unconscious, and moreover many people抯 ideas of what constitutes freedom are governed more by social convention than by their real needs. For example, it抯 likely that many leftists of the oversocialized type would say that most people, including themselves, are socialized too little rather than too much, yet the oversocialized leftist pays a heavy psychological price for his high level of socialization.SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY99. Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic component that consists of unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular component that consists of long-term historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends.100. FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term historical trend, then the effect of that change will almost always be transitory梩he trend will soon revert to its original state. (Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a society rarely has more than a short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption creeps back in. The level of political corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only slowly with the evolution of the society. Normally, a political cleanup will be permanent only if accompanied by widespread social changes; a SMALL change in the society won抰 be enough.) If a small change in a long-term historical trend appears to be permanent, it is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is already moving, so that the trend is not altered by only pushed a step ahead.101. The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable with respect to small changes, it would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other words it would not be a long- term trend at all.102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to alter permanently a long-term historical trend, then it will alter the society as a whole. In other words, a society is a system in which all parts are interrelated, and you can抰 permanently change any important part without changing all other parts as well.103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter permanently a long-term trend, then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in advance. (Unless various other societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the same consequences, in which case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes through the same change will be like to experience similar consequences.)104. FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to do.105. The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human societies. A change in human behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; the economy will affect the environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the environment will affect human behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of causes and effects is far too complex to be untangled and understood.106. FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human control.107. The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.108. To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt at social reform either acts in the direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely accelerates a change that would have occurred in any case) or else it has only a transitory effect, so that the society soon slips back into its old groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any important aspect of a society, reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not necessarily involve an armed uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second principle, a revolution never changes only one aspect of a society, it changes the whole society; and by the third principle changes occur that were never expected or desired by the revolutionaries. By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind of society, it never works out as planned.109. The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The American 揜evolution� was not a revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by a rather far-reaching political reform. The Founding Fathers did not change the direction of development of American society, nor did they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society from the retarding effect of British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but only pushed American political culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of which American society was an offshoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative democracy. And prior to the War of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant degree of representative democracy in the colonial assemblies. The political system established by the Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial assemblies. With major alteration, to be sure梩here is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important step. But it was a step along the road that English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that Britain and all of its colonies that were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with systems of representative democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding Fathers had lost their nerve and declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today would not have been significantly different. Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had a Parliament and Prime Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the American Revolution provides not a counterexample to our principles but a good illustration of them.110. Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They are expressed in imprecise language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them can be found. So we present these principles not as inviolable laws but as rules of thumb, or guides to thinking, that may provide a partial antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should be borne constantly in mind, and whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should carefully reexamine one抯 thinking and retain the conclusion only if one has good, solid reasons for doing so.INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE REFORMED111. The foregoing principles help to show how hopelessly difficult it would be to reform the industrial system in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our sphere of freedom. There has been a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolution for technology to strengthen the system at a high cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence any change designed to protect freedom from technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the development of our society. Consequently, such a change either would be a transitory one梥oon swamped by the tide of history梠r, if large enough to be permanent would alter the nature of our whole society. This by the first and second principles. Moreover, since society would be altered in a way that could not be predicted in advance (third principle) there would be great risk. Changes large enough to make a lasting difference in favor of freedom would not be initiated because it would be realized that they would gravely disrupt the system. So any attempts at reform would be too timid to be effective. Even if changes large enough to make a lasting difference were initiated, they would be retracted when their disruptive effects became apparent. Thus, permanent changes in favor of freedom could be brought about only by persons prepared to accept radical, dangerous and unpredictable alteration of the entire system. In other words by revolutionaries, not reformers.112. People anxious to rescue freedom without sacrificing the supposed benefits of technology will suggest naive schemes for some new form of society that would reconcile freedom with technology. Apart from the fact that people who make such suggestions seldom propose any practical means by which the new form of society could be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth principle that even if the new form of society could be once established, it either would collapse or would give results very different from those expected.113. So even on very general grounds it seems highly improbable that any way of changing society could be found that would reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next few sections we will give more specific reasons for concluding that freedom and technological progress are incompatible.RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY114. As explained in paragraphs 65-67, 70-73, modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations, and his fate depends on the actions of persons remote from him whose decisions he cannot influence. This is not accidental or a result of the arbitrariness of arrogant bureaucrats. It is necessary and inevitable in any technologically advanced society. The system HAS TO regulate human behavior closely in order to function. At work people have to do what they are told to do, otherwise production would be thrown into chaos. Bureaucracies HAVE TO be run according to rigid rules. To allow any substantial personal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt the system and lead to charges of unfairness due to differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their discretion. It is true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but GENERALLY SPEAKING the regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for the functioning of industrial-technological society. The result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the average person. It may be, however, that formal regulations will tend increasingly to be replaced by psychological tools that make us want to do what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14], educational techniques, 搈ental health� programs, etc.)115. The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways that are increasingly remote from the natural pattern of human behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, mathematicians and engineers. It can抰 function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in these fields. It isn抰 natural for an adolescent human being to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk absorbed in study. A normal adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. Among primitive peoples the things that children are trained to do tend to be in reasonable harmony with natural human impulses. Among the American Indians, for example, boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits�just the sort of thing that boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical subjects, which most do grudgingly.116. Because of the constant pressure that the system exerts to modify human behavior, there is a gradual increase in the number of people who cannot or will not adjust to society抯 requirements: welfare leeches, youth-gang members, cultists, anti-government rebels, radical environmentalist saboteurs, dropouts and resisters of various kinds.117. In any technologically advanced society the individual抯 fate MUST depend on decisions that he personally cannot influence to any great extent. A technological society cannot be broken down into small, autonomous communities, because production depends on the cooperation of very large numbers of people and machines. Such a society MUST be highly organized and decisions HAVE TO be made that affect very large numbers of people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of the affected individuals has, on the average, only a one-millionth share in making the decision. What usually happens in practice is that decisions are made by public officials or corporation executives, or by technical specialists, but even when the public votes on a decision the number of voters ordinarily is too large for the vote of any one individual to be significant. [17] Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major decisions that affect their lives. There is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. The system tries to 搒olve� this problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have been made for them, but even if this 搒olution� were completely successful in making people feel better, it would be demeaning.118. Conservatives and some others advocate more 搇ocal autonomy.� Local communities once did have autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local communities become more enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, computer networks, highway systems, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. Also operating against autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects people at other locations far way. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contaminate the water supply hundreds of miles downstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.119. The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, it is human behavior that has to be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the political or social ideology that may pretend to guide the technological system. It is the fault of technology, because the system is guided not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does satisfy many human needs, but generally speaking it does this only to the extend that it is to the advantage of the system to do it. It is the needs of the system that are paramount, not those of the human being. For example, the system provides people with food because the system couldn抰 function if everyone starved; it attends to people抯 psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do so, because it couldn抰 function if too many people became depressed or rebellious. But the system, for good, solid, practical reasons, must exert constant pressure on people to mold their behavior to the needs of the system. To much waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system, environmentalists, everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about recycling. Need more technical personnel? A chorus of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask whether it is inhumane to force adolescents to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them hate. When skilled workers are put out of a job by technical advances and have to undergo 搑etraining,� no one asks whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in this way. It is simply taken for granted that everyone must bow to technical necessity. and for good reason: If human needs were put before technical necessity there would be economic problems, unemployment, shortages or worse. The concept of 搈ental health� in our society is defined largely by the extent to which an individual behaves in accord with the needs of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.120. Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and for autonomy within the system are no better than a joke. For example, one company, instead of having each of its employees assemble only one section of a catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalogue, and this was supposed to give them a sense of purpose and achievement. Some companies have tried to give their employees more autonomy in their work, but for practical reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, and in any case employees are never given autonomy as to ultimate goals梩heir 揳utonomous� efforts can never be directed toward goals that they select personally, but only toward their employer抯 goals, such as the survival and growth of the company. Any company would soon go out of business if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. Similarly, in any enterprise within a socialist system, workers must direct their efforts toward the goals of the enterprise, otherwise the enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the system. Once again, for purely technical reasons it is not possible for most individuals or small groups to have much autonomy in industrial society. Even the small-business owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the necessity of government regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must fit into the economic system and conform to its requirements. For instance, when someone develops a new technology, the small-business person often has to use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain competitive.THE 態AD� PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE 慓OOD� PARTS121. A further reason why industrial society cannot be reformed in favor of freedom is that modern technology is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one another. You can抰 get rid of the 揵ad� parts of technology and retain only the 揼ood� parts. Take modern medicine, for example. Progress in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, computer science and other fields. Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can be made available only by a technologically progressive, economically rich society. Clearly you can抰 have much progress in medicine without the whole technological system and everything that goes with it.122. Even if medical progress could be maintained without the rest of the technological system, it would by itself bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is discovered. People with a genetic tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as well as anyone else. Natural selection against genes for diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout the population. (This may be occurring to some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be controlled through use of insulin.) The same thing will happen with many other diseases susceptibility to which is affected by genetic degradation of the population. The only solution will be some sort of eugenics program or extensive genetic engineering of human beings, so that man in the future will no longer be a creation of nature, or of chance, or of God (depending on your religious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.123. If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, just wait till the government starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such regulation will inevitably follow the introduction of genetic engineering of human beings, because the consequences of unregulated genetic engineering would be disastrous. [19]124. The usual response to such concerns is to talk about 搈edical ethics.� But a code of ethics would not serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only make matters worse. A code of ethics applicable to genetic engineering would be in effect a means of regulating the genetic constitution of human beings. Somebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would decide that such and such applications of genetic engineering were 揺thical� and others were not, so that in effect they would be imposing their own values on the genetic constitution of the population at large. Even if a code of ethics were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be imposing their own values on any minorities who might have a different idea of what constituted an 揺thical� use of genetic engineering. The only code of ethics that would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic engineering of human beings, and you can be sure that no such code will ever be applied in a technological society. No code that reduced genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for long, because the temptation presented by the immense power of biotechnology would be irresistible, especially since to the majority of people many of its applications will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating physical and mental diseases, giving people the abilities they need to get along in today抯 world). Inevitably, genetic engineering will be used extensively, but only in ways consistent with the needs of the industrial- technological system. [20]TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR FREEDOM125. It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and freedom, because technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually encroaches on freedom through REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at the outset owns the same amount of land, but one of whom is more powerful than the other. The powerful one demands a piece of the other抯 land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, 揙K, let抯 compromise. Give me half of what I asked.� The weak one has little choice but to give in. Some time later the powerful neighbor demands another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By forcing a long series of compromises on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his land. So it goes in the conflict between technology and freedom.126. Let us explain why technology is a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom.127. A technological advance that appears not to threaten freedom often turns out to threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider motorized transport. A walking man formerly could go where he pleased, go at his own pace without observing any traffic regulations, and was independent of technological support-systems. When motor vehicles were introduced they appeared to increase man抯 freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no one had to have an automobile if he didn抰 want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an automobile could travel much faster and farther than a walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport soon changed society in such a way as to restrict greatly man抯 freedom of locomotion. When automobiles became numerous, it became necessary to regulate their use extensively. In a car, especially in densely populated areas, one cannot just go where one likes at one抯 own pace one抯 movement is governed by the flow of traffic and by various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obligations: license requirements, driver test, renewing registration, insurance, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments on purchase price. Moreover, the use of motorized transport is no longer optional. Since the introduction of motorized transport the arrangement of our cities has changed in such a way that the majority of people no longer live within walking distance of their place of employment, shopping areas and recreational opportunities, so that they HAVE TO depend on the automobile for transportation. Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they have even less control over their own movement than when driving a car. Even the walker抯 freedom is now greatly restricted. In the city he continually has to stop to wait for traffic lights that are designed mainly to serve auto traffic. In the country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along the highway. (Note this important point that we have just illustrated with the case of motorized transport: When a new item of technology is introduced as an option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, it does not necessarily REMAIN optional. In many cases the new technology changes society in such a way that people eventually find themselves FORCED to use it.)128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE continually narrows our sphere of freedom, each new technical advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid long-distance communications ... how could one argue against any of these things, or against any other of the innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would have been absurd to resist the introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and no disadvantages. Yet, as we explained in paragraphs 59-76, all these technical advances taken together have created a world in which the average man抯 fate is no longer in his own hands or in the hands of his neighbors and friends, but in those of politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous technicians and bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] The same process will continue in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few people will resist the introduction of a genetic technique that eliminates a hereditary disease. It does no apparent harm and prevents much suffering. Yet a large number of genetic improvements taken together will make the human being into an engineered product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or whatever, depending on your religious beliefs).129. Another reason why technology is such a powerful social force is that, within the context of a given society, technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never be reversed. Once a technical innovation has been introduced, people usually become dependent on it, so that they can never again do without it, unless it is replaced by some still more advanced innovation. Not only do people become dependent as individuals on a new item of technology, but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. (Imagine what would happen to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.) Thus the system can move in only one direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take a step back, but technology can never take a step back梥hort of the overthrow of the whole technological system.130. Technology advances with great rapidity and threatens freedom at many different points at the same time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals on large organizations, propaganda and other psychological techniques, genetic engineering, invasion of privacy through surveillance devices and computers, etc.). To hold back any ONE of the threats to freedom would require a long and difficult social struggle. Those who want to protect freedom are overwhelmed by the sheer number of new attacks and the rapidity with which they develop, hence they become apathetic and no longer resist. To fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success can be hoped for only by fighting the technological system as a whole; but that is revolution, not reform.131. Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to describe all those who perform a specialized task that requires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their surrogate activity) that when a conflict arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost always decide in favor of their technical work. This is obvious in the case of scientists, but it also appears elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian groups, conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or other psychological techniques to help them achieve their laudable ends. Corporations and government agencies, when they find it useful, do not hesitate to collect information about individuals without regard to their privacy. Law enforcement agencies are frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects and often of completely innocent persons, and they do whatever they can do legally (or sometimes illegally) to restrict or circumvent those rights. Most of these educators, government officials and law officers believe in freedom, privacy and constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they usually feel that their work is more important.132. It is well known that people generally work better and more persistently when striving for a reward than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists and other technicians are motivated mainly by the rewards they get through their work. But those who oppose technological invasions of freedom are working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently there are few who work persistently and well at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved a signal victory that seemed to set up a solid barrier against further erosion of freedom through technical progress, most would tend to relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits. But the scientists would remain busy in their laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways, in spite of any barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals and make them always more dependent on the system.133. No social arrangements, whether laws, institutions, customs or ethical codes, can provide permanent protection against technology. History shows that all social arrangements are transitory; they all change or break down eventually. But technological advances are permanent within the context of a given civilization. Suppose for example that it were possible to arrive at some social arrangements that would prevent genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent it from being applied in such a way as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology would remain waiting. Sooner or later the social arrangement would break down. Probably sooner, given the pace of change in our society. Then genetic engineering would begin to invade our sphere of freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short of a breakdown of technological civilization itself). Any illusions about achieving anything permanent through social arrangements should be dispelled by what is currently happening with environmental legislation. A few years ago its seemed that there were secure legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the worst forms of environmental degradation. A change in the political wind, and those barriers begin to crumble.134. For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom. But this statement requires an important qualification. It appears that during the next several decades the industrial-technological system will be undergoing severe stresses due to economic and environmental problems, and especially due to problems of human behavior (alienation, rebellion, hostility, a variety of social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the stresses through which the system is likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least will weaken it sufficiently so that a revolution against it becomes possible. If such a revolution occurs and is successful, then at that particular moment the aspiration for freedom will have proved more powerful than technology.135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak neighbor who is left destitute by a strong neighbor who takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compromises. But suppose now that the strong neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak neighbor can force the strong one to give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man survive and only forces him to give the land back, he is a fool, because when the strong man gets well he will again take all the land for himself. The only sensible alternative for the weaker man is to kill the strong one while he has the chance. In the same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we compromise with it and let it recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom.SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED INTRACTABLE136. If anyone still imagines that it would be possible to reform the system in such a way as to protect freedom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most part unsuccessfully our society has dealt with other social problems that are far more simple and straightforward. Among other things, the system has failed to stop environmental degradation, political corruption, drug trafficking or domestic abuse.137. Take our environmental problems, for example. Here the conflict of values is straightforward: economic expedience now versus saving some of our natural resources for our grandchildren. [22] But on this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfuscation from the people who have power, and nothing like a clear, consistent line of action, and we keep on piling up environmental problems that our grandchildren will have to live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental issue consist of struggles and compromises between different factions, some of which are ascendant at one moment, others at another moment. The line of struggle changes with the shifting currents of public opinion. This is not a rational process, nor is it one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful solution to the problem. Major social problems, if they get 搒olved� at all, are rarely or never solved through any rational, comprehensive plan. They just work themselves out through a process in which various competing groups pursuing their own (usually short- term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by luck) at some more or less stable modus vivendi. In fact, the principles we formulated in paragraphs 100-106 make it seem doubtful that rational, long-term social planning can EVER be successful.138. Thus it is clear that the human race has at best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward social problems. How then is it going to solve the far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling freedom with technology? Technology presents clear-cut material advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different people, and its loss is easily obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.139. And note this important difference: It is conceivable that our environmental problems (for example) may some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this happens it will be only because it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these problems. But it is NOT in the interest of the system to preserve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the system to bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. [24] Thus, while practical considerations may eventually force the system to take a rational, prudent approach to environmental problems, equally practical considerations will force the system to regulate human behavior ever more closely (preferably by indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom). This isn抰 just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. Wilson) have stressed the importance of 搒ocializing� people more effectively.REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM140. We hope we have convinced the reader that the system cannot be reformed in such a way as to reconcile freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense with the industrial-technological system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed uprising, but certainly a radical and fundamental change in the nature of society.141. People tend to assume that because a revolution involves a much greater change than reform does, it is more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain circumstances revolution is much easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can inspire an intensity of commitment that a reform movement cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers to solve a particular social problem. A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke and create a whole new world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great risks and make great sacrifices. For this reasons it would be much easier to overthrow the whole technological system than to put effective, permanent restraints on the development or application of any one segment of technology, such as genetic engineering, for example. Not many people will devote themselves with single-minded passion to imposing and maintaining restraints on genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of people may devote themselves passionately to a revolution against the industrial-technological system. As we noted in paragraph 132, reformers seeking to limit certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a negative outcome. But revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward梖ulfillment of their revolutionary vision梐nd therefore work harder and more persistently than reformers do.142. Reform is always restrained by the fear of painful consequences if changes go too far. But once a revolutionary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing to undergo unlimited hardships for the sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian Revolutions. It may be that in such cases only a minority of the population is really committed to the revolution, but this minority is sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in society. We will have more to say about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR143. Since the beginning of civilization, organized societies have had to put pressures on human beings of the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures vary greatly from one society to another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, excessive labor, environmental pollution), some are psychological (noise, crowding, forcing human behavior into the mold that society requires). In the past, human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied only within certain bounds. Consequently, societies have been able to push people only up to certain limits. When the limit of human endurance has been passed, things start going wrong: rebellion, or crime, or corruption, or evasion of work, or depression and other mental problems, or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth rate or something else, so that either the society breaks down, or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or gradually, through conquest, attrition or evolution) replaced by some more efficient form of society. [25]144. Thus human nature has in the past put certain limits on the development of societies. People could be pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because modern technology is developing ways of modifying human beings.145. Imagine a society that subjects people to conditions that make them terribly unhappy, then gives them drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is already happening to some extent in our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression has been greatly increasing in recent decades. We believe that this is due to disruption of the power process, as explained in paragraphs 59-76. But even if we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly the result of SOME conditions that exist in today抯 society. Instead of removing the conditions that make people depressed, modern society gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antidepressants are a means of modifying an individual抯 internal state in such a way as to enable him to tolerate social conditions that he would otherwise find intolerable. (Yes, we know that depression is often of purely genetic origin. We are referring here to those cases in which environment plays the predominant role.)146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one example of the new methods of controlling human behavior that modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the other methods.147. To start with, there are the techniques of surveillance. Hidden video cameras are now used in most stores and in many other places, computers are used to collect and process vast amounts of information about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law enforcement). [26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which the mass communication media provide effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for winning elections, selling products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment industry serves as an important psychological tool of the system, possibly even when it is dishing out large amounts of sex and violence. Entertainment provides modern man with an essential means of escape. While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, frustration, dissatisfaction. Many primitive peoples, when they don抰 have work to do, are quite content to sit for hours at a time doing nothing at all, because they are at peace with themselves and their world. But most modern people must be constantly occupied or entertained, otherwise they get 揵ored,� i.e., they get fidgety, uneasy, irritable.148. Other techniques strike deeper than the foregoing. Education is no longer a simple affair of paddling a kid抯 behind when he doesn抰 know his lessons and patting him on the head when he does know them. It is becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child抯 development. Sylvan Learning Centers, for example, have had great success in motivating children to study, and psychological techniques are also used with more or less success in many conventional schools. 揚arenting� techniques that are taught to parents are designed to make children accept fundamental values of the system and behave in ways that the system finds desirable. 揗ental health� programs, 搃ntervention� techniques, psychotherapy and so forth are ostensibly designed to benefit individuals, but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to think and behave as the system requires. (There is no contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or behavior bring him into conflict with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to conquer or escape from, hence he is likely to suffer from stress, frustration, defeat. His path will be much easier if he thinks and behaves as the system requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the individual when it brainwashes him into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious forms is disapproved in most if not all cultures. Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at all is something that appalls almost everyone. But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is spanking, when used as part of a rational and consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The question will ultimately be decided by whether or not spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person fit in well with the existing system of society. In practice, the word 揳buse� tends to be interpreted to include any method of child-rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they go beyond the prevention of obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing 揷hild abuse� are directed toward the control of human behavior on behalf of the system.149. Presumably, research will continue to increase the effectiveness of psychological techniques for controlling human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological techniques alone will be sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is creating. Biological methods probably will have to be used. We have already mentioned the use of drugs in this connection. Neurology may provide other avenues for modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering of human beings is already beginning to occur in the form of 揼ene therapy,� and there is no reason to assume that such methods will not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body that affect mental functioning.150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial society seems likely to be entering a period of severe stress, due in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic and environmental problems. And a considerable proportion of the system抯 economic and environmental problems result from the way human beings behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility, rebellion; children who won抰 study, youth gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse, other crimes, unsafe sex, teen pregnancy, population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic rivalry, bitter ideological conflict (e.g., pro-choice vs. pro- life), political extremism, terrorism, sabotage, anti-government groups, hate groups. All these threaten the very survival of the system. The system will therefore be FORCED to use every practical means of controlling human behavior.151. The social disruption that we see today is certainly not the result of mere chance. It can only be a result of the conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We have argued that the most important of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems succeeds in imposing sufficient control over human behavior to assure its own survival, a new watershed in human history will have been passed. Whereas formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits on the development of societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), industrial-technological society will be able to pass those limits by modifying human beings, whether by psychological methods or biological methods or both. In the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of human beings. Instead, human being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the system. [27]152. Generally speaking, technological control over human behavior will probably not be introduced with a totalitarian intention or even through a conscious desire to restrict human freedom. [28] Each new step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as a rational response to a problem that faces society, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate or inducing young people to study science and engineering. In many cases there will be a humanitarian justification. For example, when a psychiatrist prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing that individual a favor. It would be inhumane to withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send their children to Sylvan Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic about their studies, they do so from concern for their children抯 welfare. It may be that some of these parents wish that one didn抰 have to have specialized training to get a job and that their kid didn抰 have to be brainwashed into becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can抰 change society, and their child may be unemployable if he doesn抰 have certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan.153. Thus control over human behavior will be introduced not by a calculated decision of the authorities but through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The process will be impossible to resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance will seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see paragraph 127). Propaganda for example is used for many good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or race hatred. [14] Sex education is obviously useful, yet the effect of sex education (to the extent that it is successful) is to take the shaping of sexual attitudes away from the family and put it into the hands of the state as represented by the public school system.154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered that increases the likelihood that a child will grow up to be a criminal, and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] Of course most parents whose children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would be inhumane to do otherwise, since the child would probably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a criminal. But many or most primitive societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, even though they have neither high- tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems of punishment. Since there is no reason to suppose that more modern men than primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the high crime rate of our society must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people, to which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to remove potential criminal tendencies is at least in part a way of re-engineering people so that they suit the requirements of the system.155. Our society tends to regard as a 搒ickness� any mode of thought or behavior that is inconvenient for the system, and this is plausible because when an individual doesn抰 fit into the system it causes pain to the individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation of an individual to adjust him to the system is seen as a 揷ure� for a 搒ickness� and therefore as good.156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use of a new item of technology is INITIALLY optional, it does not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to change society in such a way that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to function without using that technology. This applies also to the technology of human behavior. In a world in which most children are put through a program to make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be forced to put his kid through such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow up to be, comparatively speaking, an ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or suppose a biological treatment is discovered that, without undesirable side-effects, will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many people suffer in our society. If large numbers of people choose to undergo the treatment, then the general level of stress in society will be reduced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase the stress-producing pressures. In fact, something like this seems to have happened already with one of our society抯 most important psychological tools for enabling people to reduce (or at least temporarily escape from) stress, namely, mass entertainment (see paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is 搊ptional�: No law requires us to watch television, listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass entertainment is a means of escape and stress-reduction on which most of us have become dependent. Everyone complains about the trashiness of television, but almost everyone watches it. A few have kicked the TV habit, but it would be a rare person who could get along today without using ANY form of mass entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got along very nicely with no other entertainment than that which each local community created for itself.) Without the entertainment industry the system probably would not have been able to get away with putting as much stress-producing pressure on us as it does.157. Assuming that industrial society survives, it is likely that technology will eventually acquire something approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been established beyond any rational doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As experimenters have demonstrated, feelings such as hunger, pleasure, anger and fear can be turned on and off by electrical stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by damaging parts of the brain or they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation. Hallucinations can be induced or moods changed by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human soul, but if there is one it clearly is less powerful that the biological mechanisms of human behavior. For if that were not the case then researchers would not be able so easily to manipulate human feelings and behavior with drugs and electrical currents.158. It presumably would be impractical for all people to have electrodes inserted in their heads so that they could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human thoughts and feelings are so open to biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling human behavior is mainly a technical problem; a problem of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind of problem that is accessible to scientific attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving technical problems, it is overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the control of human behavior.159. Will public resistance prevent the introduction of technological control of human behavior? It certainly would if an attempt were made to introduce such control all at once. But since technological control will be introduced through a long sequence of small advances, there will be no rational and effective public resistance. (See paragraphs 127, 132, 153.)160. To those who think that all this sounds like science fiction, we point out that yesterday抯 science fiction is today抯 fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered man抯 environment and way of life, and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly applied to the human body and mind, man himself will be altered as radically as his environment and way of life have been.HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS161. But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one thing to develop in the laboratory a series of psychological or biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and quite another to integrate these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem is the more difficult of the two. For example, while the techniques of educational psychology doubtless work quite well in the 搇ab schools� where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them effectively throughout our educational system. We all know what many of our schools are like. The teachers are too busy taking knives and guns away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques for making them into computer nerds. Thus, in spite of all its technical advances relating to human behavior, the system to date has not been impressively successful in controlling human beings. The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the system are those of the type that might be called 揵ourgeois.� But there are growing numbers of people who in one way or another are rebels against the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs, cultists, satanists, nazis, radical environmentalists, militiamen, etc.162. The system is currently engaged in a desperate struggle to overcome certain problems that threaten its survival, among which the problems of human behavior are the most important. If the system succeeds in acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly enough, it will probably survive. Otherwise it will break down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved within the next several decades, say 40 to 100 years.163. Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next several decades. By that time it will have to have solved, or at least brought under control, the principal problems that confront it, in particular that of 搒ocializing� human beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so that heir behavior no longer threatens the system. That being accomplished, it does not appear that there would be any further obstacle to the development of technology, and it would presumably advance toward its logical conclusion, which is complete control over everything on Earth, including human beings and all other important organisms. The system may become a unitary, monolithic organization, or it may be more or less fragmented and consist of a number of organizations coexisting in a relationship that includes elements of both cooperation and competition, just as today the government, the corporations and other large organizations both cooperate and compete with one another. Human freedom mostly will have vanished, because individuals and small groups will be impotent vis-a-vis large organizations armed with supertechnology and an arsenal of advanced psychological and biological tools for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of surveillance and physical coercion. Only a small number of people will have any real power, and even these probably will have only very limited freedom, because their behavior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians and corporation executives can retain their positions of power only as long as their behavior remains within certain fairly narrow limits.164. Don抰 imagine that the systems will stop developing further techniques for controlling human beings and nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing control is no longer necessary for the system抯 survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over the system will increase its control over people and nature more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by difficulties of the kind that it is currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending control. As we explained in paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry on their work largely as a surrogate activity; that is, they satisfy their need for power by solving technical problems. They will continue to do this with unabated enthusiasm, and among the most interesting and challenging problems for them to solve will be those of understanding the human body and mind and intervening in their development. For the 揼ood of humanity,� of course.165. But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of the coming decades prove to be too much for the system. If the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a 搕ime of troubles� such as those that history has recorded at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to predict what would emerge from such a time of troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new chance. The greatest danger is that industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself within the first few years after the breakdown. Certainly there will be many people (power-hungry types especially) who will be anxious to get the factories running again.166. Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the industrial system is reducing the human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within the system so as to increase the likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a revolution against it becomes possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. And such an ideology will help to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants will be smashed beyond repair, so that the system cannot be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, technical books burned, etc.HUMAN SUFFERING167. The industrial system will not break down purely as a result of revolutionary action. It will not be vulnerable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of development lead it into very serious difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so either spontaneously, or through a process that is in part spontaneous but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is sudden, many people will die, since the world抯 population has become so overblown that it cannot even feed itself any longer without advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is gradual enough so that reduction of the population can occur more through lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the death rate, the process of de- industrialization probably will be very chaotic and involve much suffering. It is naive to think it likely that technology can be phased out in a smoothly managed, orderly way, especially since the technophiles will fight stubbornly at every step. Is it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of the system? Maybe, but maybe not. In the first place, revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down unless it is already in enough trouble so that there would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway; and the bigger the system grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it may be that revolutionaries, by hastening the onset of the breakdown, will be reducing the extent of the disaster.168. In the second place, one has to balance struggle and death against the loss of freedom and dignity. To many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or avoidance of physical pain. Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting for survival, or for a cause, than to live a long but empty and purposeless life.169. In the third place, it is not at all certain that survival of the system will lead to less suffering than breakdown of the system would. The system has already caused, and is continuing to cause, immense suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of years gave people a satisfactory relationship with each other and with their environment, have been shattered by contact with industrial society, and the result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, social and psychological problems. One of the effects of the intrusion of industrial society has been that over much of the world traditional controls on population have been thrown out of balance. Hence the population explosion, with all that that implies. Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread throughout the supposedly fortunate countries of the West (see paragraphs 44, 45). No one knows what will happen as a result of ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be foreseen. And, as nuclear proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands of dictators and irresponsible Third World nations. Would you like to speculate about what Iraq or North Korea will do with genetic engineering?170. 揙h!� say the technophiles, 揝cience is going to fix all that! We will conquer famine, eliminate psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!� Yeah, sure. That抯 what they said 200 years ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make everybody happy, etc. The actual result has been quite different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or self-deceiving) in their understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) the fact that when large changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced into a society, they lead to a long sequence of other changes, most of which are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The result is disruption of the society. So it is very probable that in their attempts to end poverty and disease, engineer docile, happy personalities and so forth, the technophiles will create social systems that are terribly troubled, even more so than the present once. For example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by creating new, genetically engineered food plants. But this will allow the human population to keep expanding indefinitely, and it is well known that crowding leads to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one example of the PREDICTABLE problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has shown, technical progress will lead to other new problems that CANNOT be predicted in advance (paragraph 103). In fact, ever since the Industrial Revolution, technology has been creating new problems for society far more rapidly than it has been solving old ones. Thus it will take a long and difficult period of trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their Brave New World (if they every do). In the meantime there will be great suffering. So it is not at all clear that the survival of industrial society would involve less suffering than the breakdown of that society would. Technology has gotten the human race into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy escape.THE FUTURE171. But suppose now that industrial society does survive the next several decades and that the bugs do eventually get worked out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. What kind of system will it be? We will consider several possibilities.172. First let us postulate that the computer scientists succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do all things better than human beings can do them. In that case presumably all work will be done by vast, highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be necessary. Either of two cases might occur. The machines might be permitted to make all of their own decisions without human oversight, or else human control over the machines might be retained.173. If the machines are permitted to make all their own decisions, we can抰 make any conjectures as to the results, because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. We only point out that the fate of the human race would be at the mercy of the machines. It might be argued that the human race would never be foolish enough to hand over all power to the machines. But we are suggesting neither that the human race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the machines would willfully seize power. What we do suggest is that the human race might easily permit itself to drift into a position of such dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of the machines� decisions. As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and as machines become more and more intelligent, people will let machines make more and more of their decisions for them, simply because machine-made decisions will bring better results than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may be reached at which the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. At that stage the machines will be in effective control. People won抰 be able to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to suicide.174. On the other hand it is possible that human control over the machines may be retained. In that case the average man may have control over certain private machines of his own, such as his car or his personal computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in the hands of a tiny elite梛ust as it is today, but with two differences. Due to improved techniques the elite will have greater control over the masses; and because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will be superfluous, a useless burden on the system. If the elite is ruthless they may simply decide to exterminate the mass of humanity. If they are humane they may use propaganda or other psychological or biological techniques to reduce the birth rate until the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, if the elite consists of soft- hearted liberals, they may decide to play the role of good shepherds to the rest of the human race. They will see to it that everyone抯 physical needs are satisfied, that all children are raised under psychologically hygienic conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy, and that anyone who may become dissatisfied undergoes 搕reatment� to cure his 損roblem.� Of course, life will be so purposeless that people will have to be biologically or psychologically engineered either to remove their need for the power process or to make them 搒ublimate� their drive for power into some harmless hobby. These engineered human beings may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly will not be free. They will have been reduced to the status of domestic animals.175. But suppose now that the computer scientists do not succeed in developing artificial intelligence, so that human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more and more of the simpler tasks so that there will be an increasing surplus of human workers at the lower levels of ability. (We see this happening already. There are many people who find it difficult or impossible to get work, because for intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of training necessary to make themselves useful in the present system.) On those who are employed, ever-increasing demands will be placed: They will need more and more training, more and more ability, and will have to be ever more reliable, conforming and docile, because they will be more and more like cells of a giant organism. Their tasks will be increasingly specialized, so that their work will be, in a sense, out of touch with the real world, being concentrated on one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that it can, whether psychological or biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that the system requires and to 搒ublimate� their drive for power into some specialized task. But the statement that the people of such a society will have to be docile may require qualification. The society may find competitiveness useful, provided that ways are found of directing competitiveness into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a future society in which there is endless competition for positions of prestige and power. But no more than a very few people will ever reach the top, where the only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repellent is a society in which a person can satisfy his need for power only by pushing large numbers of other people out of the way and depriving them of THEIR opportunity for power.176. One can envision scenarios that incorporate aspects of more than one of the possibilities that we have just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will take over most of the work that is of real, practical importance, but that human beings will be kept busy by being given relatively unimportant work. It has been suggested, for example, that a great development of the service industries might provide work for human beings. Thus people would spent their time shining each other抯 shoes, driving each other around in taxicabs, making handicrafts for one another, waiting on each other抯 tables, etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human race to end up, and we doubt that many people would find fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, dangerous outlets (drugs, crime, 揷ults,� hate groups) unless they were biologically or psychologically engineered to adapt them to such a way of life.177. Needless to say, the scenarios outlined above do not exhaust all the possibilities. They only indicate the kinds of outcomes that seem to us most likely. But we can envision no plausible scenarios that are any more palatable than the ones we抳e just described. It is overwhelmingly probable that if the industrial- technological system survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that time have developed certain general characteristics: Individuals (at least those of the 揵ourgeois� type, who are integrated into the system and make it run, and who therefore have all the power) will be more dependent than ever on large organizations; they will be more 搒ocialized� than ever and their physical and mental qualities to a significant extent (possibly to a very great extent) will be those that are engineered into them rather than being the results of chance (or of God抯 will, or whatever); and whatever may be left of wild nature will be reduced to remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision and management of scientists (hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long run (say a few centuries from now) it is likely that neither the human race nor any other important organisms will exist as we know them today, because once you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is no reason to stop at any particular point, so that the modifications will probably continue until man and other organisms have been utterly transformed.178. Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that technology is creating for human beings a new physical and social environment radically different from the spectrum of environments to which natural selection has adapted the human race physically and psychologically. If man is not adjusted to this new environment by being artificially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to it through a long and painful process of natural selection. The former is far more likely than the latter.179. It would be better to dump the whole stinking system and take the consequences.STRATEGY180. The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into the unknown. Many people understand something of what technological progress is doing to us yet take a passive attitude toward it because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don抰 think it is inevitable. We think it can be stopped, and we will give here some indications of how to go about stopping it.181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks for the present are to promote social stress and instability in industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the industrial system. When the system becomes sufficiently stressed and unstable, a revolution against technology may be possible. The pattern would be similar to that of the French and Russian Revolutions. French society and Russian society, for several decades prior to their respective revolutions, showed increasing signs of stress and weakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were being developed that offered a new world view that was quite different from the old one. In the Russian case, revolutionaries were actively working to undermine the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient additional stress (by financial crisis in France, by military defeat in Russia) it was swept away by revolution. What we propose is something along the same lines.182. It will be objected that the French and Russian Revolutions were failures. But most revolutions have two goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set up the new form of society envisioned by the revolutionaries. The French and Russian revolutionaries failed (fortunately!) to create the new kind of society of which they dreamed, but they were quite successful in destroying the old society. We have no illusions about the feasibility of creating a new, ideal form of society. Our goal is only to destroy the existing form of society.183. But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic support, must have a positive ideal as well as a negative one; it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive ideal that we propose is Nature. That is, WILD nature: those aspects of the functioning of the Earth and its living things that are independent of human management and free of human interference and control. And with wild nature we include human nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of the human individual that are not subject to regulation by organized society but are products of chance, or free will, or God (depending on your religious or philosophical opinions).184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several reasons. Nature (that which is outside the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to expand indefinitely the power of the system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has tremendous popular appeal. The radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and opposes technology. [30] It is not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or any new kind of social order. Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous creation that existed long before any human society, and for countless centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted with nature without doing it an excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the effect of human society on nature become really devastating. To relieve the pressure on nature it is not necessary to create a special kind of social system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. Granted, this will not solve all problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous damage to nature and it will take a very long time for the scars to heal. Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do significant damage to nature. Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great deal. It will relieve the worst of the pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the capacity of organized society to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature). Whatever kind of society may exist after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people will live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced technology there is no other way that people CAN live. To feed themselves they must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunters, etc. And, generally speaking, local autonomy should tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid communications will limit the capacity of governments or other large organizations to control local communities.185. As for the negative consequences of eliminating industrial society梬ell, you can抰 eat your cake and have it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.186. Most people hate psychological conflict. For this reason they avoid doing any serious thinking about difficult social issues, and they like to have such issues presented to them in simple, black-and-white terms: THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology should therefore be developed on two levels.187. On the more sophisticated level the ideology should address itself to people who are intelligent, thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a core of people who will be opposed to the industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appreciation of the problems and ambiguities involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the system. It is particularly important to attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be instrumental in influencing others. These people should be addressed on as rational a level as possible. Facts should never intentionally be distorted and intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no appeal can be made to the emotions, but in making such appeal care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting the truth or doing anything else that would destroy the intellectual respectability of the ideology.188. On a second level, the ideology should be propagated in a simplified form that will enable the unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in unambiguous terms. But even on this second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so cheap, intemperate or irrational that it alienates people of the thoughtful and rational type. Cheap, intemperate propaganda sometimes achieves impressive short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in the long run to keep the loyalty of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the passions of an unthinking, fickle mob who will change their attitude as soon as someone comes along with a better propaganda gimmick. However, propaganda of the rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point of collapse and there is a final struggle between rival ideologies to determine which will become dominant when the old world-view goes under.189. Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to have a majority of people on their side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the majority, which seldom has a clear and consistent idea of what it really wants. Until the time comes for the final push toward revolution [31], the task of revolutionaries will be less to win the shallow support of the majority than to build a small core of deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make them aware of the existence of the new ideology and remind them of it frequently; though of course it will be desirable to get majority support to the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of seriously committed people.190. Any kind of social conflict helps to destabilize the system, but one should be careful about what kind of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between the mass of the people and the power-holding elite of industrial society (politicians, scientists, upper-level business executives, government officials, etc.). It should NOT be drawn between the revolutionaries and the mass of the people. For example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to condemn Americans for their habits of consumption. Instead, the average American should be portrayed as a victim of the advertising and marketing industry, which has suckered him into buying a lot of junk that he doesn抰 need and that is very poor compensation for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the facts. It is merely a matter of attitude whether you blame the advertising industry for manipulating the public or blame the public for allowing itself to be manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the public.191. One should think twice before encouraging any other social conflict than that between the power- holding elite (which wields technology) and the general public (over which technology exerts its power). For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the important conflicts (between power-elite and ordinary people, between technology and nature); for another thing, other conflicts may actually tend to encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants to use technological power to gain advantages over its adversary. This is clearly seen in rivalries between nations. It also appears in ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America many black leaders are anxious to gain power for African Americans by placing back individuals in the technological power-elite. They want there to be many black government officials, scientists, corporation executives and so forth. In this way they are helping to absorb the African American subculture into the technological system. Generally speaking, one should encourage only those social conflicts that can be fitted into the framework of the conflicts of power-elite vs. ordinary people, technology vs nature.192. But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT through militant advocacy of minority rights (see paragraphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that although minorities do suffer more or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is of peripheral significance. Our real enemy is the industrial- technological system, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic distinctions are of no importance.193. The kind of revolution we have in mind will not necessarily involve an armed uprising against any government. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be a POLITICAL revolution. Its focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]194. Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID assuming political power, whether by legal or illegal means, until the industrial system is stressed to the danger point and has proved itself to be a failure in the eyes of most people. Suppose for example that some 揼reen� party should win control of the United States Congress in an election. In order to avoid betraying or watering down their own ideology they would have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic shrinkage. To the average man the results would appear disastrous: There would be massive unemployment, shortages of commodities, etc. Even if the grosser ill effects could be avoided through superhumanly skillful management, still people would have to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted. Dissatisfaction would grow, the 揼reen� party would be voted out of office and the revolutionaries would have suffered a severe setback. For this reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political power until the system has gotten itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as resulting from the failures of the industrial system itself and not from the policies of the revolutionaries. The revolution against technology will probably have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from above.195. The revolution must be international and worldwide. It cannot be carried out on a nation-by-nation basis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for example, should cut back on technological progress or economic growth, people get hysterical and start screaming that if we fall behind in technology the Japanese will get ahead of us. Holy robots! The world will fly off its orbit if the Japanese ever sell more cars than we do! (Nationalism is a great promoter of technology.) More reasonably, it is argued that if the relatively democratic nations of the world fall behind in technology while nasty, dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea continue to progress, eventually the dictators may come to dominate the world. That is why the industrial system should be attacked in all nations simultaneously, to the extent that this may be possible. True, there is no assurance that the industrial system can be destroyed at approximately the same time all over the world, and it is even conceivable that the attempt to overthrow the system could lead instead to the domination of the system by dictators. That is a risk that has to be taken. And it is worth taking, since the difference between a 揹emocratic� industrial system and one controlled by dictators is small compared with the difference between an industrial system and a non-industrial one. [33] It might even be argued that an industrial system controlled by dictators would be preferable, because dictator-controlled systems usually have proved inefficient, hence they are presumably more likely to break down. Look at Cuba.196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures that tend to bind the world economy into a unified whole. Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to the environment in the short run, but in the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic interdependence between nations. It will be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide basis if the world economy is so unified that its breakdown in any one major nation will lead to its breakdown in all industrialized nations.197. Some people take the line that modern man has too much power, too much control over nature; they argue for a more passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best these people are expressing themselves unclearly, because they fail to distinguish between power for LARGE ORGANIZATIONS and power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for powerlessness and passivity, because people NEED power. Modern man as a collective entity梩hat is, the industrial system梙as immense power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as evil. But modern INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever did. Generally speaking, the vast power of 搈odern man� over nature is exercised not by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the extent that the average modern INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he is permitted to do so only within narrow limits and only under the supervision and control of the system. (You need a license for everything and with the license come rules and regulations.) The individual has only those technological powers with which the system chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is slight.198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS actually had considerable power over nature; or maybe it would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When primitive man needed food he knew how to find and prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it with homemade weapons. He knew how to protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But primitive man did relatively little damage to nature because the COLLECTIVE power of primitive society was negligible compared to the COLLECTIVE power of industrial society.199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passivity, one should argue that the power of the INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the power and freedom of INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS.200. Until the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked, the destruction of that system must be the revolutionaries� ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy from the main goal. More importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themselves to have any other goal than the destruction of technology, they will be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching that other goal. If they give in to that temptation, they will fall right back into the technological trap, because modern technology is a unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain SOME technology, one finds oneself obliged to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing only token amounts of technology.201. Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took 搒ocial justice� as a goal. Human nature being what it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to be enforced. In order to enforce it the revolutionaries would have to retain central organization and control. For that they would need rapid long-distance transportation and communication, and therefore all the technology needed to support the transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor people they would have to use agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so forth. So that the attempt to insure social justice would force them to retain most parts of the technological system. Not that we have anything against social justice, but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get rid of the technological system.202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system without using SOME modern technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to spread their message. But they should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the technological system.203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine in front of him. Suppose he starts saying to himself, 揥ine isn抰 bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts of wine are even good for you! It won抰 do me any harm if I take just one little drink.... � Well you know what is going to happen. Never forget that the human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a barrel of wine.204. Revolutionaries should have as many children as they can. There is strong scientific evidence that social attitudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests that a social attitude is a direct outcome of a person抯 genetic constitution, but it appears that personality traits are partly inherited and that certain personality traits tend, within the context of our society, to make a person more likely to hold this or that social attitude. Objections to these findings have been raised, but the objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically motivated. In any event, no one denies that children tend on the average to hold social attitudes similar to those of their parents. From our point of view it doesn抰 matter all that much whether the attitudes are passed on genetically or through childhood training. In either case they ARE passed on.205. The trouble is that many of the people who are inclined to rebel against the industrial system are also concerned about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or no children. In this way they may be handing the world over to the sort of people who support or at least accept the industrial system. To insure the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the present generation should reproduce itself abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only slightly. And the important problem is to get rid of the industrial system, because once the industrial system is gone the world抯 population necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, if the industrial system survives, it will continue developing new techniques of food production that may enable the world抯 population to keep increasing almost indefinitely.206. With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only points on which we absolutely insist are that the single overriding goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no other goal can be allowed to compete with this one. For the rest, revolutionaries should take an empirical approach. If experience indicates that some of the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs are not going to give good results, then those recommendations should be discarded.TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY207. An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is that it is bound to fail, because (it is claimed) throughout history technology has always progressed, never regressed, hence technological regression is impossible. But this claim is false.208. We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call small-scale technology and organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is technology that can be used by small-scale communities without outside assistance. Organization-dependent technology is technology that depends on large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of regression in small-scale technology. But organization-dependent technology DOES regress when the social organization on which it depends breaks down. Example: When the Roman Empire fell apart the Romans� small-scale technology survived because any clever village craftsman could build, for instance, a water wheel, any skilled smith could make steel by Roman methods, and so forth. But the Romans� organization-dependent technology DID regress. Their aqueducts fell into disrepair and were never rebuilt. Their techniques of road construction were lost. The Roman system of urban sanitation was forgotten, so that not until rather recent times did the sanitation of European cities equal that of Ancient Rome.209. The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until perhaps a century or two before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale technology. But most of the technology developed since the Industrial Revolution is organization-dependent technology. Take the refrigerator for example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a post-industrial machine shop it would be virtually impossible for a handful of local craftsmen to build a refrigerator. If by some miracle they did succeed in building one it would be useless to them without a reliable source of electric power. So they would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators require large amounts of copper wire. Imagine trying to make that wire without modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for refrigeration? It would be much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or picking, as was done before the invention of the refrigerator.210. So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly broken down, refrigeration technology would quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-dependent technology. And once this technology had been lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to rebuild it, just as it took centuries to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be few and scattered. An industrial society, if built from scratch without outside help, can only be built in a series of stages: You need tools to make tools to make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic development and progress in social organization is required. And, even in the absence of an ideology opposed to technology, there is no reason to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding industrial society. The enthusiasm for 損rogress� is a phenomenon peculiar to the modern form of society, and it seems not to have existed prior to the 17th century or thereabouts.211. In the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were about equally 揳dvanced�: Europe, the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). Three of those civilizations remained more or less stable, and only Europe became dynamic. No one knows why Europe became dynamic at that time; historians have their theories but these are only speculation. At any rate, it is clear that rapid development toward a technological form of society occurs only under special conditions. So there is no reason to assume that a long-lasting technological regression cannot be brought about.212. Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an industrial-technological form? Maybe, but there is no use in worrying about it, since we can抰 predict or control events 500 or 1,000 years in the future. Those problems must be dealt with by the people who will live at that time.THE DANGER OF LEFTISM213. Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, leftists or persons of similar psychological type often are unattracted to a rebellious or activist movement whose goals and membership are not initially leftist. The resulting influx of leftish types can easily turn a non-leftist movement into a leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of the movement.214. To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature and opposes technology must take a resolutely anti-leftist stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Leftism is in the long run inconsistent with wild nature, with human freedom and with the elimination of modern technology. Leftism is collectivist; it seeks to bind together the entire world (both nature and the human race) into a unified whole. But this implies management of nature and of human life by organized society, and it requires advanced technology. You can抰 have a united world without rapid transportation and communication, you can抰 make all people love one another without sophisticated psychological techniques, you can抰 have a 損lanned society� without the necessary technological base. Above all, leftism is driven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks power on a collective basis, through identification with a mass movement or an organization. Leftism is unlikely ever to give up technology, because technology is too valuable a source of collective power.215. The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks it on an individual or small-group basis; he wants individuals and small groups to be able to control the circumstances of their own lives. He opposes technology because it makes small groups dependent on large organizations.216. Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but they will oppose it only so long as they are outsiders and the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If leftism ever becomes dominant in society, so that the technological system becomes a tool in the hands of leftists, they will enthusiastically use it and promote its growth. In doing this they will be repeating a pattern that leftism has shown again and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in Russia were outsiders, they vigorously opposed censorship and the secret police, they advocated self-determination for ethnic minorities, and so forth; but as soon as they came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter censorship and created a more ruthless secret police than any that had existed under the tsars, and they oppressed ethnic minorities at least as much as the tsars had done. In the United States, a couple of decades ago when leftists were a minority in our universities, leftist professors were vigorous proponents of academic freedom, but today, in those of our universities where leftists have become dominant, they have shown themselves ready to take away from everyone else抯 academic freedom. (This is 損olitical correctness.�) The same will happen with leftists and technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if they ever get it under their own control.217. In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-hungry type, repeatedly, have first cooperated with non-leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more libertarian inclination, and later have double- crossed them to seize power for themselves. Robespierre did this in the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks did it in the Russian Revolution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 and Castro and his followers did it in Cuba. Given the past history of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for non-leftist revolutionaries today to collaborate with leftists.218. Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a kind of religion. Leftism is not a religion in the strict sense because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of any supernatural being. But, for the leftist, leftism plays a psychological role much like that which religion plays for some people. The leftist NEEDS to believe in leftism; it plays a vital role in his psychological economy. His beliefs are not easily modified by logic or facts. He has a deep conviction that leftism is morally Right with a capital R, and that he has not only a right but a duty to impose leftist morality on everyone. (However, many of the people we are referring to as 搇eftists� do not think of themselves as leftists and would not describe their system of beliefs as leftism. We use the term 搇eftism� because we don抰 know of any better words to designate the spectrum of related creeds that includes the feminist, gay rights, political correctness, etc., movements, and because these movements have a strong affinity with the old left. See paragraphs 227-230.)219. Leftism is a totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is in a position of power it tends to invade every private corner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part this is because of the quasi-religious character of leftism; everything contrary to leftist beliefs represents Sin. More importantly, leftism is a totalitarian force because of the leftists� drive for power. The leftist seeks to satisfy his need for power through identification with a social movement and he tries to go through the power process by helping to pursue and attain the goals of the movement (see paragraph 83). But no matter how far the movement has gone in attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, because his activism is a surrogate activity (see paragraph 41). That is, the leftist抯 real motive is not to attain the ostensible goals of leftism; in reality he is motivated by the sense of power he gets from struggling for and then reaching a social goal. [35] Consequently the leftist is never satisfied with the goals he has already attained; his need for the power process leads him always to pursue some new goal. The leftist wants equal opportunities for minorities. When that is attained he insists on statistical equality of achievement by minorities. And as long as anyone harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude toward some minority, the leftist has to re-educated him. And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be allowed to have a negative attitude toward homosexuals, disabled people, fat people, old people, ugly people, and on and on and on. It抯 not enough that the public should be informed about the hazards of smoking; a warning has to be stamped on every package of cigarettes. Then cigarette advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The activists will never be satisfied until tobacco is outlawed, and after that it will be alcohol, then junk food, etc. Activists have fought gross child abuse, which is reasonable. But now they want to stop all spanking. When they have done that they will want to ban something else they consider unwholesome, then another thing and then another. They will never be satisfied until they have complete control over all child rearing practices. And then they will move on to another cause.220. Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL the things that were wrong with society, and then suppose you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded. It is safe to say that within a couple of years the majority of leftists would find something new to complain about, some new social 揺vil� to correct because, once again, the leftist is motivated less by distress at society抯 ills than by the need to satisfy his drive for power by imposing his solutions on society.221. Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts and behavior by their high level of socialization, many leftists of the over-socialized type cannot pursue power in the ways that other people do. For them the drive for power has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in the struggle to impose their morality on everyone.222. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, are True Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer抯 book, 揟he True Believer.� But not all True Believers are of the same psychological type as leftists. Presumably a true-believing nazi, for instance, is very different psychologically from a true-believing leftist. Because of their capacity for single-minded devotion to a cause, True Believers are a useful, perhaps a necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary movement. This presents a problem with which we must admit we don抰 know how to deal. We aren抰 sure how to harness the energies of the True Believer to a revolution against technology. At present all we can say is that no True Believer will make a safe recruit to the revolution unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of technology. If he is committed also to another ideal, he may want to use technology as a tool for pursuing that other ideal (see paragraphs 220, 221).223. Some readers may say, 揟his stuff about leftism is a lot of crap. I know John and Jane who are leftish types and they don抰 have all these totalitarian tendencies.� It抯 quite true that many leftists, possibly even a numerical majority, are decent people who sincerely believe in tolerating others� values (up to a point) and wouldn抰 want to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals. Our remarks about leftism are not meant to apply to every individual leftist but to describe the general character of leftism as a movement. And the general character of a movement is not necessarily determined by the numerical proportions of the various kinds of people involved in the movement.224. The people who rise to positions of power in leftist movements tend to be leftists of the most power- hungry type, because power-hungry people are those who strive hardest to get into positions of power. Once the power-hungry types have captured control of the movement, there are many leftists of a gentler breed who inwardly disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but cannot bring themselves to oppose them. They NEED their faith in the movement, and because they cannot give up this faith they go along with the leaders. True, SOME leftists do have the guts to oppose the totalitarian tendencies that emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-hungry types are better organized, are more ruthless and Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a strong power base.225. These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and other countries that were taken over by leftists. Similarly, before the breakdown of communism in the USSR, leftish types in the West would seldom criticize that country. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many wrong things, but then they would try to find excuses for the communists and begin talking about the faults of the West. They always opposed Western military resistance to communist aggression. Leftish types all over the world vigorously protested the U.S. military action in Vietnam, but when the USSR invaded Afghanistan they did nothing. Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because of their leftist faith, they just couldn抰 bear to put themselves in opposition to communism. Today, in those of our universities where 損olitical correctness� has become dominant, there are probably many leftish types who privately disapprove of the suppression of academic freedom, but they go along with it anyway.226. Thus the fact that many individual leftists are personally mild and fairly tolerant people by no means prevents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian tendency.227. Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It is still far from clear what we mean by the word 搇eftist.� There doesn抰 seem to be much we can do about this. Today leftism is fragmented into a whole spectrum of activist movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, and some activist movements (e.g., radical environmentalism) seem to include both personalities of the leftist type and personalities of thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to know better than to collaborate with leftists. Varieties of leftists fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and we ourselves would often be hard-pressed to decide whether a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent that it is defined at all, our conception of leftism is defined by the discussion of it that we have given in this article, and we can only advise the reader to use his own judgment in deciding who is a leftist.228. But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diagnosing leftism. These criteria cannot be applied in a cut and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of the criteria without being leftists, some leftists may not meet any of the criteria. Again, you just have to use your judgment.229. The leftist is oriented toward large-scale collectivism. He emphasizes the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. He has a negative attitude toward individualism. He often takes a moralistic tone. He tends to be for gun control, for sex education and other psychologically 揺nlightened� educational methods, for social planning, for affirmative action, for multiculturalism. He tends to identify with victims. He tends to be against competition and against violence, but he often finds excuses for those leftists who do commit violence. He is fond of using the common catch- phrases of the left, like 搑acism,� 搒exism,� 揾omophobia,� 揷apitalism,� 搃mperialism,� 搉eocolonialism,� 揼enocide,� 搒ocial change,� 搒ocial justice,� 搒ocial responsibility.� Maybe the best diagnostic trait of the leftist is his tendency to sympathize with the following movements: feminism, gay rights, ethnic rights, disability rights, animal rights, political correctness. Anyone who strongly sympathizes with ALL of these movements is almost certainly a leftist. [36]230. The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who are most power-hungry, are often characterized by arrogance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However, the most dangerous leftists of all may be certain oversocialized types who avoid irritating displays of aggressiveness and refrain from advertising their leftism, but work quietly and unobtrusively to promote collectivist values, 揺nlightened� psychological techniques for socializing children, dependence of the individual on the system, and so forth. These crypto- leftists (as we may call them) approximate certain bourgeois types as far as practical action is concerned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and motivation. The ordinary bourgeois tries to bring people under control of the system in order to protect his way of life, or he does so simply because his attitudes are conventional. The crypto-leftist tries to bring people under control of the system because he is a True Believer in a collectivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated from the average leftist of the oversocialized type by the fact that his rebellious impulse is weaker and he is more securely socialized. He is differentiated from the ordinary well-socialized bourgeois by the fact that there is some deep lack within him that makes it necessary for him to devote himself to a cause and immerse himself in a collectivity. And maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is stronger than that of the average bourgeois.FINAL NOTE231. Throughout this article we抳e made imprecise statements and statements that ought to have had all sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and some of our statements may be flatly false. Lack of sufficient information and the need for brevity made it impossible for us to formulate our assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of course in a discussion of this kind one must rely heavily on intuitive judgment, and that can sometimes be wrong. So we don抰 claim that this article expresses more than a crude approximation to the truth.232. All the same, we are reasonably confident that the general outlines of the picture we have painted here are roughly correct. Just one possible weak point needs to be mentioned. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form as a phenomenon peculiar to our time and as a symptom of the disruption of the power process. But we might possibly be wrong about this. Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing their morality on everyone have certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role played by feelings of inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by people who are not themselves victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by people not themselves victims can be seen to some extent in 19th century leftism and early Christianity but as far as we can make out, symptoms of low self-esteem, etc., were not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other movements, as they are in modern leftism. But we are not in a position to assert confidently that no such movements have existed prior to modern leftism. This is a significant question to which historians ought to give their attention.Notes1. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even most, bullies and ruthless competitors suffer from feelings of inferiority.2. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many oversocialized people suffered from serious psychological problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their sexual feelings. Freud apparently based his theories on people of this type. Today the focus of socialization has shifted from sex to aggression.3. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists in engineering or the 揾ard� sciences.4. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the middle and upper classes who resist some of these values, but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such resistance appears in the mass media only to a very limited extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is in favor of the stated values.The main reason why these values have become, so to speak, the official values of our society is that they are useful to the industrial system. Violence is discouraged because it disrupts the functioning of the system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts also disrupt the system, and discrimination wastes the talents of minority-group members who could be useful to the system. Poverty must be 揷ured� because the underclass causes problems for the system and contact with the underclass lowers the morale of the other classes. Women are encouraged to have careers because their talents are useful to the system and, more importantly, because by having regular jobs women become better integrated into the system and tied directly to it rather than to their families. This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders of the system say they want to strengthen the family, but they really mean is that they want the family to serve as an effective tool for socializing children in accord with the needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51, 52 that the system cannot afford to let the family or other small-scale social groups be strong or autonomous.)5. (Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority of people don抰 want to make their own decisions but want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an element of truth in this. People like to make their own decisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult, fundamental questions requires facing up to psychological conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict. Hence they tend to lean on others in making difficult decisions. But it does not follow that they like to have decisions imposed upon them without having any opportunity to influence those decisions. The majority of people are natural followers, not leaders, but they like to have direct personal access to their leaders, they want to be able to influence the leaders and participate to some extent in making even the difficult decisions. At least to that degree they need autonomy.6. (Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by caged animals.To explain how these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the power process:Common-sense understanding of human nature tells one that lack of goals whose attainment requires effort leads to boredom and that boredom, long continued, often leads eventually to depression. Failure to attain goals leads to frustration and lowering of self-esteem. Frustration leads to anger, anger to aggression, often in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been shown that long-continued frustration commonly leads to depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep disorders, eating disorders and bad feelings about oneself. Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure as an antidote; hence insatiable hedonism and excessive sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. Boredom too tends to cause excessive pleasure-seeking since, lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal. See accompanying diagram.The foregoing is a simplification. Reality is more complex, and of course, deprivation with respect to the power process is not the ONLY cause of the symptoms described.By the way, when we mention depression we do not necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be treated by a psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of depression are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not necessarily mean long-term, thought-out goals. For many or most people through much of human history, the goals of a hand-to-mouth existence (merely providing oneself and one抯 family with food from day to day) have been quite sufficient.7. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for a few passive, inward-looking groups, such as the Amish, which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from these, some genuine small-scale communities do exist in America today. For instance, youth gangs and 揷ults.� Everyone regards them as dangerous, and so they are, because the members of these groups are loyal primarily to one another rather than to the system, hence the system cannot control them.Or take the gypsies. The gypsies commonly get away with theft and fraud because their loyalties are such that they can always get other gypsies to give testimony that 損roves� their innocence. Obviously the system would be in serious trouble if too many people belonged to such groups.Some of the early-20th century Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing China recognized the necessity breaking down small-scale social groups such as the family: �(According to Sun Yat-sen) the Chinese people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of loyalty from the family to the state.... (According to Li Huang) traditional attachments, particularly to the family had to be abandoned if nationalism were to develop in China.� (Chester C. Tan, 揅hinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century,� page 125, page 297.)8. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, and serious ones, but for the sake of brevity we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.9. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the 搖nderclass.� We are speaking of the mainstream.10. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators, 搈ental health� professionals and the like are doing their best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see to it that everyone has a satisfactory social life.11. (Paragraphs 63, 82) Is the drive for endless material acquisition really an artificial creation of the advertising and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate human drive for material acquisition. There have been many cultures in which people have desired little material wealth beyond what was necessary to satisfy their basic physical needs (Australian aborigines, traditional Mexican peasant culture, some African cultures). On the other hand there have also been many pre-industrial cultures in which material acquisition has played an important role. So we can抰 claim that today抯 acquisition-oriented culture is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing industry. But it is clear that the advertising and marketing industry has had an important part in creating that culture. The big corporations that spend millions on advertising wouldn抰 be spending that kind of money without solid proof that they were getting it back in increased sales. One member of FC met a sales manager a couple of years ago who was frank enough to tell him, 揙ur job is to make people buy things they don抰 want and don抰 need.� He then described how an untrained novice could present people with the facts about a product, and make no sales at all, while a trained and experienced professional salesman would make lots of sales to the same people. This shows that people are manipulated into buying things they don抰 really want.12. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness seems to have become less serious during the last 15 years or so, because people now feel less secure physically and economically than they did earlier, and the need for security provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has been replaced by frustration over the difficulty of attaining security. We emphasize the problem of purposelessness because the liberals and leftists would wish to solve our social problems by having society guarantee everyone抯 security; but if that could be done it would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The real issue is not whether society provides well or poorly for people抯 security; the trouble is that people are dependent on the system for their security rather than having it in their own hands. This, by the way, is part of the reason why some people get worked up about the right to bear arms; possession of a gun puts that aspect of their security in their own hands.13. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives� efforts to decrease the amount of government regulation are of little benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the regulations can be eliminated because most regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation affects business rather than the average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the government and give it to private corporations. What this means for the average man is that government interference in his life is replaced by interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for example, to dump more chemicals that get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just taking the average man for a sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of Big Business.14. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the purpose for which propaganda is being used in a given case, he generally calls it 揺ducation� or applies to it some similar euphemism. But propaganda is propaganda regardless of the purpose for which it is used.15. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or disapproval of the Panama invasion. We only use it to illustrate a point.16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there were fewer and less effective legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution went into effect, yet there was more personal freedom in pre-industrial America, both before and after the War of Independence, than there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We quote from 揤iolence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,� edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12 by Roger Lane, pages 476-478:揟he progressive heightening of standards of propriety, and with it the increasing reliance on official law enforcement (in 19th century America) ... were common to the whole society.... [T]he change in social behavior is so long term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with the most fundamental of contemporary social processes; that of industrial urbanization itself....擬assachusetts in 1835 had a population of some 660,940, 81 percent rural, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. It抯 citizens were used to considerable personal freedom. Whether teamsters, farmers or artisans, they were all accustomed to setting their own schedules, and the nature of their work made them physically independent of each other.... Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not generally cause for wider social concern....擝ut the impact of the twin movements to the city and to the factory, both just gathering force in 1835, had a progressive effect on personal behavior throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. The factory demanded regularity of behavior, a life governed by obedience to the rhythms of clock and calendar, the demands of foreman and supervisor. In the city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neighborhoods inhibited many actions previously unobjectionable. Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger establishments were mutually dependent on their fellows; as one man抯 work fit into anther抯, so one man抯 business was no longer his own.揟he results of the new organization of life and work were apparent by 1900, when some 76 percent of the 2,805,346 inhabitants of Massachusetts were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular behavior which had been tolerable in a casual, independent society was no longer acceptable in the more formalized, cooperative atmosphere of the later period.... The move to the cities had, in short, produced a more tractable, more socialized, more 慶ivilized� generation than its predecessors.�17. (Paragraph 117) Apologists for the system are fond of citing cases in which elections have been decided by one or two votes, but such cases are rare.18. (Paragraph 119) 揟oday, in technologically advanced lands, men live very similar lives in spite of geographical, religious, and political differences. The daily lives of a Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo, and a Communist bank clerk in Moscow are far more alike than the life of any one of them is like that of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. These similarities are the result of a common technology....� L. Sprague de Camp, 揟he Ancient Engineers,� Ballantine edition, page 17.The lives of the three bank clerks are not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have SOME effect. But all technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve along APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.19. (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic engineer might create a lot of terrorists.20. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of undesirable consequences of medical progress, suppose a reliable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment is too expensive to be available to any but the elite, it will greatly reduce their incentive to stop the escape of carcinogens into the environment.21. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that a large number of good things can add up to a bad thing, we illustrate with an analogy. Suppose Mr. A is playing chess with Mr. B. Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over Mr. A抯 shoulder. Mr. A of course wants to win his game, so if Mr. C points out a good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But suppose now that Mr. C tells Mr. A how to make ALL of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A a favor by showing him his best move, but by making ALL of his moves for him he spoils his game, since there is not point in Mr. A抯 playing the game at all if someone else makes all his moves.The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system makes an individual抯 life easier for him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him of control over his own fate.22. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the conflict of values within the mainstream. For the sake of simplicity we leave out of the picture 搊utsider� values like the idea that wild nature is more important than human economic welfare.23. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MATERIAL self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of some psychological need, for example, by promoting one抯 own ideology or religion.24. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest of the system to permit a certain prescribed degree of freedom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with suitable limitations and restraints) has proved effective in promoting economic growth. But only planned, circumscribed, limited freedom is in the interest of the system. The individual must always be kept on a leash, even if the leash is sometimes long (see paragraphs 94, 97).25. (Paragraph 143) We don抰 mean to suggest that the efficiency or the potential for survival of a society has always been inversely proportional to the amount of pressure or discomfort to which the society subjects people. That certainly is not the case. There is good reason to believe that many primitive societies subjected people to less pressure than European society did, but European society proved far more efficient than any primitive society and always won out in conflicts with such societies because of the advantages conferred by technology.26. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law enforcement is unequivocally good because it suppresses crime, then remember that crime as defined by the system is not necessarily what YOU would call crime. Today, smoking marijuana is a 揷rime,� and, in some places in the U.S., so is possession of an unregistered handgun. Tomorrow, possession of ANY firearm, registered or not, may be made a crime, and the same thing may happen with disapproved methods of child-rearing, such as spanking. In some countries, expression of dissident political opinions is a crime, and there is no certainty that this will never happen in the U.S., since no constitution or political system lasts forever.If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then there is something gravely wrong with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so many refuse to follow the rules, or follow them only because forced. Many societies in the past have gotten by with little or no formal law- enforcement.27. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have had means of influencing human behavior, but these have been primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the technological means that are now being developed.28. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have publicly expressed opinions indicating their contempt for human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon was quoted in Omni (August 1987) as saying, 揑 visualize a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to humans, and I抦 rooting for the machines.�29. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After writing paragraph 154 we came across an article in Scientific American according to which scientists are actively developing techniques for identifying possible future criminals and for treating them by a combination of biological and psychological means. Some scientists advocate compulsory application of the treatment, which may be available in the near future. (See 揝eeking the Criminal Element,� by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific American, March 1995.) Maybe you think this is OK because the treatment would be applied to those who might become violent criminals. But of course it won抰 stop there. Next, a treatment will be applied to those who might become drunk drivers (they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who spank their children, then to environmentalists who sabotage logging equipment, eventually to anyone whose behavior is inconvenient for the system.30. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as a counter-ideal to technology is that, in many people, nature inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with religion, so that nature could perhaps be idealized on a religious basis. It is true that in many societies religion has served as a support and justification for the established order, but it is also true that religion has often provided a basis for rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce a religious element into the rebellion against technology, the more so because Western society today has no strong religious foundation. Religion, nowadays either is used as cheap and transparent support for narrow, short-sighted selfishness (some conservatives use it this way), or even is cynically exploited to make easy money (by many evangelists), or has degenerated into crude irrationalism (fundamentalist protestant sects, 揷ults�), or is simply stagnant (Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing to a strong, widespread, dynamic religion that the West has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion of leftism, but leftism today is fragmented and has no clear, unified, inspiring goal.Thus there is a religious vacuum in our society that could perhaps be filled by a religion focused on nature in opposition to technology. But it would be a mistake to try to concoct artificially a religion to fill this role. Such an invented religion would probably be a failure. Take the 揋aia� religion for example. Do its adherents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If they are just play-acting their religion will be a flop in the end.It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into the conflict of nature vs. technology unless you REALLY believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a deep, strong, genuine response in many other people.31. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push occurs. Conceivably the industrial system might be eliminated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion (see paragraphs 4, 167 and Note 4).32. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely) that the revolution might consist only of a massive change of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively gradual and painless disintegration of the industrial system. But if this happens we抣l be very lucky. It抯 far more probably that the transition to a nontechnological society will be very difficult and full of conflicts and disasters.33. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological structure of a society are far more important than its political structure in determining the way the average man lives (see paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).34. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our particular brand of anarchism. A wide variety of social attitudes have been called 揳narchist,� and it may be that many who consider themselves anarchists would not accept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted, by the way, that there is a nonviolent anarchist movement whose members probably would not accept FC as anarchist and certainly would not approve of FC抯 violent methods.35. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by hostility, but the hostility probably results in part from a frustrated need for power.36. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that we mean someone who sympathizes with these MOVEMENTS as they exist today in our society. One who believes that women, homosexuals, etc., should have equal rights is not necessary a leftist. The feminist, gay rights, etc., movements that exist in our society have the particular ideological tone that characterizes leftism, and if one believes, for example, that women should have equal rights it does not necessarily follow that one must sympathize with the feminist movement as it exists today.If copyright problems make it impossible for this long quotation to be printed, then please change Note 16 to read as follows:16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there were fewer and less effective legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution went into effect, yet there was more personal freedom in pre-industrial America, both before and after the War of Independence, than there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. In 揤iolence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,� edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12 by Roger Lane, it is explained how in pre-industrial America the average person had greater independence and autonomy than he does today, and how the process of industrialization necessarily led to the restriction of personal freedom.

1、极简的深邃，不炫技的好。

2、着急快进片头星人看完整季直到最后来打分看演员表时才认出保罗·贝坦尼，不知道是脸盲症加重还是演技太手术刀。

有一类好演员是藏在角色背后褪去个人烙印的，身体是角色的容器，这才是整容版演技的正确打开方式，让人欣喜又尊敬，百倍千倍的喜欢。

第六集太教科书。

3、孤独是一种状态，寂寞是一种心态。

群居的人不孤独，但还是会寂寞；独居的人是孤独的，但不一定寂寞。

普通人因为自己的“普通”，靠着烟火气能去化解孤独和寂寞，对于绝顶聪明的人反而更难。

因为普通人在社会标准下是“正常”的，绝顶聪明的人“不正常”的概率才大，这也解释了为什么大多被普通人视为freak/weird/怪胎的智商都超高。

所以才有“鹤立鸡群”与“高处不胜寒”这样的词与句——绝顶聪明的“怪胎”注定要承受比普通人更多孤独与寂寞，个中滋味也会被千百倍的放大。

但在他们中间，有人能去写出瓦尔登湖，有人能演绎成《美丽心灵》，运气如童话说不定还能被烟火气的身边人宠成谢耳朵，但只有Ted Kaczynski成了Unabomber。

孤独和寂寞，以及因孤独和寂寞所带来的磨难，从来不是“造就恐怖”的理由，一旦迈过底线成为恐怖分子，万劫不复，没得辩解。

无论是因其磨难而生的同情、因其见解而生的赞成、因其困苦而生的感同身受，都已在反人类的行为面前烟消云散。

剧中的结尾让人隐隐却抑制不住的悲泣，Ted Kaczynski在牢房中转身和在林间小屋前的雨中听着巴赫恣意旋转的交错画面，使用得平实、常规，却说不出的颤动人心。

Ted Kaczynski并不可悲，可悲的是这件事，可悲的是发生这件事的这个世界。

这个世界造出了太多绝望的事而令人失望，但至少在这件事上，他补救性地派来了Fitz。

只有这个克星能抓住这个炸弹客。

2018年6月24日追记：看完《追缉：炸弹客 Manhunt: Unabomber》之后的半年多，陆续遇到了几部“类似”的剧或电影，无意间对“炸弹客”这部剧/这件事/这个人产生了更多的思考。

我的世界观偏悲观，所以倾向这个世界的根本是属“恶”的。

虽然有些断章取义，但此时很适合说，“人间不值得”——嗯，在《三体》里，我大概会是“降临派”。

“恶意”无处不在，变着法儿想要折腾你，击垮你，“生活”凭什么要对你好呢？

如果说你活了这么久，完全没有感受过世界的“恶意”，一帆风顺，平凡，平庸，无聊，甚至无趣，这也许是那么多受过苦的人烧香拜佛也求不来的——不用看那些能拍成电影的breaking news，看看日常的社会新闻就能明白，没被生活虐过，那不过是我们太幸运罢了。

我设想过很多次——如果世界“恶化”到《使女的故事》，或者重回《纳粹医生》里“平庸之恶”的世界，那么在“恶贯满盈”中，“抵抗”是真正坚强、且有求生欲的“英雄”的选择；凡人大概就是妥协，服从，被虐；而我大概会是主教男主家上吊的那一个。

如果我碰上《凭空而来Aus dem Nichts》这样的事，大概也会像丧夫丧子的女主那样选择。

“活着”是给想活的人，如果不想了，那就把魔鬼拽进地狱。

如果我是《你从未在此 You Were Never Really Here》中的杰昆，没了妈妈，如果再没有小女孩，自杀的那一枪是会开的，活着真的太苦了。

是啊，“活着”对于很多人来说，真的太苦了。

但再苦，我也绝不会成为“炸弹客”，绝不会成为安德鲁·库纳南（美国犯罪故事 第二季）当“恶”围攻时，才更需要“善”的突围；而正因为“恶”的存在，“善”才显得更有分量。

这种分量是《至暗时刻》中带着恐慌、不确定却依然鼓足勇气喊出的“Never”，是《大明王朝1566》中被塑造得像是圣经中的天使般的海瑞，是《琅琊榜之风起长林》中看似“愚忠”的长林王——你会觉得这些人“好蠢啊”，但这世上作恶的“聪明人”已经够多，实在是太多了。

如果这世界对你就是这么恶意，如果“人人都献出一点恶”的时代卷土重来，你会不会加入“恶”，成为“恶”？

我不会。

我的枪口至多会对着自己，但永远不会朝向那些无辜的、想活下去、并配得上活下去的人。

至少我真心希望我不会。

近期看了一部片子，叫炸弹追凶。

片中一恐怖分子通过向别人寄炸弹的形式逼迫政府允许发表自己的政治宣言，以达到传播自己观点的目的。

当他看到报纸头版上报道了自己的文章，他已经意识到自己的毕生所愿已经完成。

但是接下来该怎么办？

他想要收手，但是他依然平息不了自己的怒火，回味自己制造炸弹的过程，无法摆脱自己的过去，他在癫狂中煎熬，最后发出一声哀叹：Can’t we grow?这里的grow指成长，即intellectual gowth,通常指人生达到了一个新时期，信念价值的质变，是遥远过去的的信念之种，比如一次经历或某本书的一句话，在漫长的岁月里渐渐成型，意识到时，已经开花结果，深深扎根于心智的土壤，辐射到思想行为之中。

我们当然可以成长，但有很多东西我们改变不了，但同时也不应该改变。

有时候，改变或不改变都需要极大的韧性与勇气。

我们可以成长么？

当然能。

有研究已经证实脑神经在成年后依然再继续生长分裂，不断有新的突触生成，里面存储着新的记忆，与以前的经验相连接，所以成长并不是成年后就停止了。

同时，我们的观念也在不断改变，因为我们不断在接受新的信息，当我们接触到一些新颖理论后，我们会从一种全新的视角看待过去，我们可以看到原先零散的知识或个人经历串成一条轨迹，可以为我们指明前路，创造以前无法想象的可能性，我曾经见过很多平凡无奇的事物在一些独特的视角下可以提供意想不到的洞见。

最后，我们的选择决定我们的环境，在与物质、社会、符号环境的不断互动中，我们不断行动，创造新的经历，在向某一目标前进的过程中，我们可能会收获比完成目标更宝贵的东西。

但是有些东西我们无法改变。

比如，我们性格里的某些‘缺陷’，可能来自基因、童年经历或仅仅是一些不幸的巧合。

我们经常高估有多少思考是有意识完成，其实大多情感和动机是无意识中产生的，而潜藏在无意识中的正是我们从过去的经历中形成的价值与反射。

我们必须将这些价值或预设从无意识中抽取出来，用理性去检验，这是一个负责任人生的第一步。

之后我们要用更加辩证的观点去替代之前的观点，但同时我们还得看看我们不理性的想法背后所折现的价值，我觉着这同样有巨大的价值。

我们应该不把这些缺陷/价值看做是界限（limit），而应该当做约束（constraint），界限通常表达的是我们能到达的最远的边界，而约束则是我们投入精力的导管，是解决问题的提示而非无法逾越的阻碍。

我们的文化里觉得孤僻不好，开放是好，听话是好，不服管教是坏。

但是殊不知，用诸如“好坏”这种意义不明，抽象，甚至带有险恶暗示和联想的字眼去评价别人，反而我经常觉得评价者头脑简单，缺乏同情心。

我认为成长是摆脱抽象观念的束缚，停止用简单的标签去评价别人，因为简单的归类通常意味着简单的行为与虚假的联想。

我们的语言不仅要更加具体，我们还得不断接受新的论证与解释，这是一个终其一生不断累积的过程。

成长是一个过程的描述，而非一个理想的最终状态。

（文/杨时旸）终于，FBI抓住了那个声名狼藉的连环炸弹客，在此之前的十几年中，他用一颗又一颗自制的炸弹包裹让3人丧命，让23人重伤，除了尸体和残肢，他没有给警方留下任何可能追查到自己的线索。

抓捕行动成功之后，警探们在酒吧里庆祝，互相吹嘘着自己的胆识以及抓捕瞬间的壮举，而高层领导们则在媒体镜头前侃侃而谈，论述自己制定的方案与策略多么行之有效。

唯独没有人提及菲茨杰拉德——那个真正的寻获线索的抓捕者，一个习惯于沉默和被忽视的幕后英雄。

这个男人神情苍凉地默默走过举杯痛饮的同事和夸夸其谈的上司，开车上路，去往了那个炸弹客在丛林里为自己搭建的小屋。

他走进那个没有自来水，不通电，没有任何现代文明迹象的屋子，一寸又一寸地抚摸过所有木头，然后慢慢转身，关上了房门。

某种程度上说，是这个瞬间成就了《炸弹追凶》，这是最野心勃勃的一幕，也是最胆大妄为的一幕，它奠定了整个故事的基调，完成了男主角最重大的内心转折，让这个故事从所有这一类连环杀手的俗常设定中飞升。

菲茨杰拉德是凝视深渊的人，但深渊不只回望于他，更难以想象的是，他认同了深渊——从某个层面上讲。

关闭房门的那个瞬间，抓捕者和炸弹客从精神意义上开始重叠。

与其说《炸弹追凶》的主角是被追捕的凶犯泰德，不如说，真正的主角是追缉者菲茨杰拉德，这个木讷但坚韧的男人，被调往这个特别行动组之初不会想到，这个案件会如此诡异又残忍地改变自己的一生。

原本，像绝大多数警察一样，他希冀于一个重大的案件为自己的履历增光添彩，但这个案件把他逐出了家庭，让他远离人群，继而甚至让他开始怀疑自己曾经坚定的信念。

《炸弹追凶》的故事始自于一场寻访，FBI的几位高层人士在一座森林小屋里找到了已经隐居的菲茨杰拉德，希望他能够帮助警方与连环炸弹客泰德进行后续谈判，以便让他认罪，因为后者声称只愿意和那个“真正抓住自己”的人对话。

很快，这个短暂的镜头就被之后回溯的追捕故事和一次次令人焦虑的失败冲淡了，直到最终，人们才会明白，菲茨杰拉德从木屋走出的那一刻意味着什么——某种程度上说，菲茨杰拉德部分信仰了泰德的理论，他剔除了暴力报复的部分，也没有变得那么彻底而极端，但是，有些无法说清的东西终究进入了他的大脑。

他的隐居，他的孤僻，他对于世俗热闹的拒斥，对于人群的厌倦，都犹如泰德的再生和还魂。

这个瞬间和当初他独自一人走进泰德的木屋的瞬间，彼此交接互相印证。

真正的对手都是难得的知己。

只有让自己成为那个人，才能真的抓获那个人，这是唯一的途径。

于是，菲茨杰拉德分析了对手所写下的一词一句，这是个无意识的漫浸过程，他觉得自己是在追捕敌人，但却在下意识中修改了自己。

这才是故事最隐秘的核心。

这部8集的罪案剧改编自真实事件，一个智商超群的数学教授厌弃了现代文明，自己躲进了密林深处的木屋，他毁灭了一个又一个他心中与现代文明相关的人，院校的学者或者电脑供应商，连环炸弹是他的策略，他想由此让自己得到重视。

他给几家重要媒体寄送了自己写作的宣言，呼唤人们返璞归真，不要被科技反噬。

这份声明是他的精神支柱，却最终成为了线索将自己送入了监牢。

谁能参透这其中宿命般残忍的幽默。

菲茨杰拉德的追凶过程几乎建立在一片虚空之上，语言，竟然成为了擒获一个暴力犯罪者的通路。

那份激昂的宣言中，泰德流露出了个人的语言习惯，那些独特的倒置的词汇，被菲茨杰拉德命名为犯罪语言学，这被主流嗤之以鼻，但这个玄学般的断案方式，却被他执拗地认定，在他心里，那些琐碎的辞藻就是一个人的精神指纹。

最终，那几行字母让人们抓获了这个疯狂却又缜密的男人。

《炸弹追凶》有火光冲天的爆炸，也有FBI声势铺张的抓捕，但是相较于这些，它更像一幕心理追凶的暗战戏码。

这故事里到处都是处心积虑的研判和难以言明的揣度。

菲茨杰拉德和泰德的对决如此，而在FBI这一方阵营之内，同样如是。

这个故事的成功之处在于，从未吝笔墨去展现那些存在于正义方之中的内耗、挫败、慌乱、困惑以及绝望的不知所措。

这个故事的有趣之处在于，描述了一个人搅乱了一个世界的故事。

从这个意义上讲，炸弹客泰德就犹如神。

而FBI内部不过是一群凡人。

而最终，菲茨杰拉德成为了另一尊神。

对于普通的犯罪者而言，被抓获是终结，而对于泰德而言，这不过是个逗号，下半场刚刚启幕。

但他没有想到，之前，他玩弄全世界于股掌，而这一次，他竟然成为了自己律师以及法律体系的玩物。

他的律师企图瞒骗他，以精神错乱作为辩护理由为其脱罪。

对于绝大多数罪犯而言，去往病院总比老死狱中强过太多，但是，泰德又怎能允许自己最终以疯子的面目被世人回忆。

这成为了这幕心理暗战故事的高潮。

从旁人看来，泰德的行为无疑是疯癫的，但从他本人的价值观出发，他认为自己才是理性的警示者和预言家，而其他那些被科技控制的人类都疯狂得毫不自知。

所以，于他而言，最大的惩罚并非牢狱之灾，而是疯癫的污名。

菲茨杰拉德利用这一切把他逼入了死角，让他独自完成一场二选一的游戏：以疯子的身份进入精神病院，在接连不断的电击和服药之后，成为一个“正常人”，平庸而呆滞，找一份工作，办一张信用卡，吃着垃圾食品看着肥皂剧度过一生，或者，入狱成圣，继续维系自己的尖锐和愤怒。

泰德一直有着自己独特的体面，不是物质层面，而是精神意义上的体面，有条不紊，内心笃定，但这最后的抉择让他濒临崩溃，他选择了后者，主动认罪当然是一种羞辱，但如若不然就得经受被贴上疯癫标签的更大的羞辱。

菲茨杰拉德赢了吗？

赢得也并不体面。

泰德输了吗？

即便是输了，但他却切实地篡改了对手的内心世界。

对抗的过程中，菲茨杰拉德稳固的信念边界也开始抖动，科技是否意味着对人性的解放？

社交是否比孤僻更能定义一个人的正常？

疑窦丛生。

他开始思索生活中那些简单的被命名为教养的习惯，那些根本空无一人的深夜路口，自己仍然会在红灯前默默停下。

这到底是文明的进步还是精神的桎梏？

最后的一幕，菲茨杰拉德在路口，抬头盯着红色的信号灯，一脸若有所思但终究无解的神情，嘴边有细若游丝的笑意但又满含深重无比的悲悯。

这表情像极了泰德。

（本文首发《北京青年报》）

按理说，这是一部有野心的剧集。

有野心的意思是案件和解谜都不是终点，有些更深、更具普遍意义的主题要探讨和表达。

双线叙事，然后合成一股。

一条线是95年的破案，写不再年轻的新进探员Fitz加入Unabomber专案组，写他怎样不囿于权威和威权独立思考，怎样独辟蹊径抽丝剥茧，怎样废寝忘食浑然忘我，怎样不择手段不惜伤人，怎样被排挤被抢功，怎样感到迷惑而离群索居；另一条线是97年的审案，像Ted一样在荒僻的小屋里独居两年的Fitz为了夺回功劳也为了“找到答案”，开始了和Ted的几次交锋： 第一回合Fitz试图拉近关系，以“我懂你”的姿态“帮”你选最好的一条出路，Ted挑明Fitz不过是想摆脱自己的职业困境放手一搏，更反戈一击说我之所以对你另眼相看恰恰是因为你跟我是同一种人，你看待语言的角度不同，这就是摆脱奴役、重获自由的第一步，臊眉耷眼的Fitz险些给策反，完败。

第二回合Fitz把手里的证据都摆给Ted看，告诉他铁证如山，plead guilty是对他最有利的选项，Fitz反击说这些证据都来自对小木屋的搜查，而那张搜查令只建立在你创立的“鉴证语言学”所给出的孤证上，我只要在法庭上揪住这个薄弱环节穷追猛打，所有这些“铁证”就轰然坍塌，随之一起毁灭的还有你的信誉、名声和前途，以及你心心念念的“鉴证语言学”。

完败。

第三回合Fitz自觉抓到了Ted的痛点：认罪你还能以“Unabomber”之名永存于世，如果否认而且脱罪，你的manifesto就只是澹妄诳语，连你自己都不敢认的宣言，还指望有人相信吗？

自由和legacy，你总得放弃一样。

Ted说你跟我提legacy？

我才是你的legacy吧？

你急于要我认罪，难道不是因为你最迫切的渴望，就是证明自己不一样，宣示自己比任何别的人都聪明，难道不是因为抓到我，是你仅有的、最大的成就？

下一个镜头，Fitz离开，两个人在没人看得到的地方，不约而同地扶住墙捂着胸口。

杀敌一千，自损八百，这一回合，算是Ted惨胜。

最后一个回合，Fitz带Ted来到他被连根拔起的小屋，告诉他律师打算用“精神异常”为他辩护，告诉他你以为最坏的情况不过一死？

不不不他们连这个也不会给你，你会...被“治好”，会变“正常”，会重新回到社会，跟你所鄙视的任何一只“羊”一样，过那个你用了一生反对和抗争的人生。

这一次，连杀身成仁的机会也没给你留下。

当Ted失掉他一直以来的风度和冷静，像被逼到墙角的困兽一样詈骂和摔打，Fitz知道这次他赢了。

然而真是他赢了吗？

击败Unabomber的，究竟是不合群的探员，还是无形无质又无远弗届无所不能的社会规则，或者负责“抹除”“异端邪说”的“他们”？

Ted认了罪，他是个殉道者，是个战士；他虽然屈从于法律，却没有放弃自己的信念。

Fitz呢？

他所描述给Ted的那个，让一个连环爆炸案的嫌犯恐惧到宁可坐一辈子牢的“正常”生活，不正是他自己已经过了半辈子，还将再过半辈子的人生？

所以，究竟是谁，还要坐一辈子的牢？

******************************* 我并不认为Ted关于现代科技的想法是什么深刻洞见，我甚至不觉得它新鲜： “科技成为了事实上的控制者，它迫着人们一刻不停地追求更快的车，更高的楼，更强大的电脑，更聪明的电话；如果这一切的初衷是为了更好的生活，那它也早已偏离了那个轨道，成了人们纠结、纷争、身不由己的源泉。

人，成了机器的奴隶”。

所以，“科技社会本质上是反自由的，要想重新获得自由，必须毁掉科技，回到更原始、更本真的生活形态里去”。

然而“更原始、更本真”的田园生活，真的美好过吗？

日出而作，日入而息，一年的辛苦，可能仅能温饱，最大的奢望，不过风调雨顺；孩子不一定生得下来，生下来很可能养不大；生了病基本看命，再富贵的大人物也未必有的救；遇到灾年离乱，易子而食不是一种修辞。

就算一切太平和顺，一直被生存压得透不过气的人，连一件衣服都要自己种棉、收棉、脱籽、纺纱、织布、染色、浆洗、裁缝才能上身的人，就“自由”了？

就摆脱奴役了？

“没有科技的美好生活”不过现代人自带滤镜的矫情想象。

科技让我们活下去的机会更大，成本更低，交流更容易，科技让我们走得更远，见得更多，视角更全面。

更重要的，它使资源的利用效率更高，可供利用的资源更多，它使我们的获得，不必以其他人的失去为代价，使我们的自由，不必以对别人的奴役为前提。

今天的任何一个城里的普通人，在物质上的享受都不输古代贵族，但我们任何一个人的家里都没有“下人”。

今天我们不必再面对“让儿子饿死还是让母亲饿死”的选择——这个星球上依然每天都有人死于食物匮乏导致的营养不良，但那绝不是因为科技，而是因为没有科技。

况且，就算要“回滚”到没有科技主宰人类的幸福时光去，回到那一步算结束呢？

消灭电子产品、消灭电气机械、消灭蒸汽机、消灭锄头镰刀这些铁器、还是消灭驯化畜养和种植？

打从树上下来开始，人类哪一天、哪一步没有技术的存在呢？

Ted要宣布科技的罪状，却滑稽地选了邮政系统来作为恐怖袭击的目标——邮件的系统传递，难道不是在第一次工业革命以前就早已存在的？

反对它，你到底是要说什么呢？

还有，你在丛林木屋里的本真生活，却也没阻碍你骑一辆老旧的自行车，到镇上读几书架的机器印刷出来的图书——再老旧的自行车，难道是可以徒手造出来的？

没有科技，你一辈子接触到的书，可能也没有一个书架上陈列的那么多。

科技不是丧失自由的根由，人才是。

******************************* Ted和Fitz共同恐惧的，是现代社会下人的异化。

Fitz两次描绘过他在深夜的十字路口等红灯过去的体悟，路上一辆车也没有，然而他依然机械地，顺服地，停在路口等绿灯亮起。

与其说这是科技对他做了什么，不如说是外来规则已经内化为行动准则；“合群”的压力，塑造了一部分的他。

在最后一次谈话中，Fitz耐心地描摹了Ted以精神异常脱罪后的正常生活：“......他们会把你关到精神病院去，然后用那些“疗法”——威胁、惩罚、奖励，直到把你彻底治好。

可能得花好多年，可你肯定会被“治好”的。

你会变成“正常”人，你会重新回到社会。

你会有信用卡，公寓，衣柜里挂着商务休闲装...你会有份坐办公室的工作，朝九晚五，按部就班。

拿到第一个月工资你会买部手机，第二个月买台电视，要是奢侈点再买部任天堂。

你每天晚上躺在床上看电视直到睡着，每个周末去商场，逛逛电器城，心里琢磨着是现在换台20英寸的好，还是再攒攒钱，换个更大的？

...可能有人认出你是Unabomber，你回答他‘是，我是，不过我那时脑子有病。

我现在都治好了。

’然后，你回家接着看电视去了。

你甚至记不起来你曾经想要的东西，想说的话。

” 如果治好了的Ted再加把劲儿，凭借数学天分做个火箭科学家，把城里的小公寓换成郊区的大房子，娶个金发的trophy太太，生两个孩子，大的是儿子，小的是女儿，养了条名叫fluffy的狗，两部车，一部福特sedan，一部SUV，周六除草，周日上教堂，每年旅行两次，一次去滑雪，一次去海边。

咦，好像这叫“美国梦”来着。

这是真正捆住我们的东西。

高度的分工使人退化为大机器上的小零件——我不是在说流水线上的产业工人，我是在说格子间里的你、在7-11排队的你，我也是在说觥筹交错间的你、商务舱和五星酒店里的你。

学会反思、总是发问的零部件，机器表示不太喜欢。

所以，社会期待、群体压力铸好了模范，它以理所当然的姿态，告诉人们什么才是“幸福”的、“成功”的、“值得一活”的人生，人“应该”喜欢什么，“应该”厌弃什么。

我是祖国一块砖，哪里需要哪里搬，这不挺好么？

Fitz觉得不好。

1997年的那条线上，Fitz去找从前的合作伙伴、语言学女博士Janet，说出自己的纠结和痛苦： Fitz：“我不知道从什么时候开始觉得这么...无力。

” Janet：“每个人都有这种感觉，每个人都有。

” Fitz：“如果每个人都是这种感觉，那我们做了什么吗？

什么都没有。

我们喜欢那种感觉，喜欢那种被困被束缚被打败的感觉。

也许自由比奴役更让我们害怕。

” Janet：“事实就是我们什么都做不了，这就是生活，你只能忍下去，活下去。

” Fitz：“不，这不叫生活，这就是活着而已，这叫梦游。

看电视，吃垃圾食品，天天上班好为了谁去成就点什么。

从来没人做点什么，连试都不敢试，除了Ted。

” Janet：“是！

他试过，可是Fitz，他是Unabomber，他是个坏人。

” Fitz是愤怒而迷惑的，他不甘心做大机器上的一颗小螺钉。

这不甘心赶着他从穿制服的小巡警变成联邦调查局行为分析部的探员，赶着他几乎是单枪匹马地破了几百人忙了好几年的案子。

他渴望名声、荣誉、权力、尊重，他渴望一切世俗意义上的成功，为此不惜出卖尊敬他的伙伴，不惜利用Janet的好感。

但他更害怕平庸，害怕“未经审视的人生”，甚于害怕孤独。

他远远近近目之所及的地方，只有Ted一个同伴。

他抓住Unabomber是为了功成名就，但他同意去劝Ted认罪低头，是为了向同路的先行者、与整个现代社会作战的堂吉诃德，求个辗转反侧、求而不得的答案。

Ted没答案。

他看对了问题，却给错了解法。

童年的创伤和性格的偏执，使他虽然敏锐地看到人的普遍工具化，以及由此带来的消费主义的泛滥、独立思考的式微，却给不出现实的解决办法，只能归咎于“机器”“科技”，只能主张人们都退出都市，退回山野丛林中去，凿井而饮，耕田而食。

他认为这样，被异化的人就能得救，被剥夺的自由就能取回。

如果不行，“就算作为一个人死去，也好过当一个机器上的齿轮苟且偷生。

” 剧集的末尾，Fitz又一次停在深夜的十字路口，在空无一人的大街上，等着红灯过去。

他没找到他的答案，而且，他依然只有一个人。

******************************* Ted和Fitz的孤独，其实并不难懂，也一点不少见。

有一个问题终极性地把人从“动物”的类别里分离出来——“我想怎样过完我的一生？

” 而所谓“自由”，也许就是自己寻找问题答案的权力。

不是每个人都有这种“高级”的烦恼。

但一旦开始想它，相信我，你就再也不能不想了。

好消息是，清醒自觉地开始思考这个问题的那一刻起，你向“人”的进化就已完成。

坏消息是，这种自觉使你再不能容忍别的什么人把答案写好硬塞给你，把剧本写好要你照着演。

Ted的反抗很激烈，他成了Unabomber；Fitz的反抗比较温和，他离开了贤妻在怀、幼子绕膝的“完美”探员人生，一个人走进了Ted同款小木屋。

在这个意义上，自由并不是一种blessing，“寻找自己的路”的定义，天然捆绑了“孤独”。

“自由”的吊诡在于，你一旦开始意识到它的存在——意识到你不必活成别人期待的样子，意识到你只欠你自己一个人生——它就像个流氓软件一样再也删不掉了，你无法回到“没意识到”的状态。

对“醒”过来的人来说，“成功人生”是好的，但它必须是“我自己的选择”。

Ted的弟弟说，哥哥在牢里呆着也许更好：一日三餐热汤热水，有人照顾，有人保护，连牢房的尺寸都和哥哥的林中小屋差不多——他在那小屋里离群索居地过活，跟坐牢又有什么分别？

Ted说，如果世上真有种药，吃下去就能把我变“正常”，让我能不再想所有这些...问题，我想我可能真的选择把它吞下去。

不过，那必须是我的选择。

“有什么分别”吗？

就是这个分别。

******************************* 不为了政治正确，有些话也不能省。

Ted是天才，也经历了非常残酷的对待，他有一切权利愤怒，但没有任何权力迁怒；他有一切权利追寻自由，但没有任何权力用暴力胁迫别人一起走；他一生呼号捍卫“自由”，然而那些受害者的人生道路，难道不是被他强行截断和改变的？

夺走他们选择自由的，难道不正是Ted自己？

Ted智力上很早就已成年，但他心智从未成熟：他仍然依靠哭闹吸引父母的关注，只是哭闹换成了邮件炸弹和恐怖威胁；他一直停步在“反叛”权威，像个青春期的熊孩子，好像社会什么样，权威能说了算似的；他应对成长的烦恼就一条——“我不长大了”，幻想着永远停留在小时候，没有问题的、充满安全感的小时候。

人类从刀耕火种走到现代社会，这条路是回不了头的。

就像人总要长大变老死去，它也无人能够阻挡。

Ted聚焦在“发展”带来的问题上——人的异化、机器对人的控制、战争、环境恶化，但他怎么能够对发展给人类福利带来的巨大飞跃视而不见呢？

有问题就一个一个解决，有危机就一个一个化解，这是成年人的思维方式。

幻想一劳永逸解决所有麻烦，Ted真的只是个缺爱的熊孩子。

作为全球享有盛誉、拥趸上亿的纪实电视节目公司，美国“探索”频道在今年夏天推了出第一部电视剧作品――“Manhunt：Unabomber”，译名作《炸弹追凶》。

在“寓知识于娱乐”的指导原则下，“探索”频道选择进入电视剧领域并不令人意外。

电视剧毕竟是近十年以来大众娱乐节目中最具创新性、艺术性、社会性的表现形式。

美国“历史”频道早在2012年就已经尝试在人文科教频道中播出高制作水准的历史电视剧，各路叫好声一片、收视率一路冲高，“探索”频道的革新步伐似乎还显得缓慢一些。

值得探究的是，为什么选择 “Unabomber”这个在上世纪80、90年代轰动一时、人尽皆知的连环爆炸案作为首部电视剧作品的题材？

在谜底一开场就被揭晓，新闻报导已多如牛毛的背景之下，如何设置悬念、制造冲突，吸引观众们一周一集地紧紧追剧？

如何挖掘这起案件中尚不为人熟知却又精彩刺激的科学因素，不违背“拓宽视野、增长见识”的频道宗旨？

如何紧贴当前社会环境，让这一起20年前旧案能够与时俱进，赋予观众“感同身受”的现实意义？

下周三（9月13日）这部八集电视剧将迎来大结局。

大家可以在一个漫长沉闷的假日，不被打扰、酣畅淋漓地看完全剧。

在看剧之前，我们也许要恶补一下背景知识，试着了解一位普通美国观众对“Unabomber”案件的基本观感，才能逐渐领略这部美剧的精妙有趣，引人之胜之处。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　谁解救无能的FBI？

Unabomber是一个合成词。

Un指大学（University），A指航空公（Airline），Bomber指炸弹客，译作“校航炸弹客”。

从1978年5月25日至1995年4月24日这长达17年的时间，“校航炸弹客”利用各类邮件邮寄了16个包裹，造成23人受伤、共3人死亡，其中大部分是大学校园精英阶层的知识分子，其中一名受害者是一名即将成宇航员的电力工程学硕士。

虽然死伤人数并非触目惊心，但是“校航炸弹案”却成为美国历史上耗时最长，耗资最巨、投入警察力量最多案子。

美国联邦调查局，美国烟酒及枪支管理局、美国邮政检查署三家机构组成百人专案小组，运用一切高科技手段展开调查，包括∶分析炸弹碎片的物理成分以确定零部件来源；检测邮包残留的DNA、指纹等生物线索以确定嫌疑人身份；邀请请犯罪心理学专家进行人物侧写以缩小嫌疑人范围等。

专案组甚至从军方借来了一台超级计算机、建立一个庞大数据库，进行关键词检索与交叉分析，在伊利诺斯州、犹他州、加利福尼亚州等三个案发地区分别列出了数千人的嫌疑犯名单。

名单上的每一个人都被彻底调查了一番，每一个人也都被排除了嫌疑。

数十年间，专案组获得的唯一真实可信的线索就是一位目击者对于“校航炸弹客”的外表描述，对于其年龄、身份、背景、教育程度与犯罪意图等核心因素则是一直毫无所知。

1996年案件破获时，新闻媒体将主要功劳归结于罪犯弟弟的举报，认为如果没有这位有识之士的“大义灭亲”之举，“校航炸弹客”仍会逍遥法外，给民众心理上带来极大恐慌。

但是，事实的真相是这样吗？

联邦调查局真的如此无能吗？

“探索”频道的剧集简介开门见山指出，将调查从一无所获的泥沼中解救出来的是“法医鉴定语言学”（Forensic linguistics），一种从未被认证也从未被使用的犯罪调查方法，通过罪犯发表信件的语言习惯特征来确定其个人身份。

当时，这种方法被不少专业人士视为“天方夜谭”，认为只是“病急乱投医”罢了，不料却在案件侦破的每一个关键环节成为识别罪犯身份的唯一利器。

第三集中，协助破案的语言学女博士讲一个关于斯拉夫人起源故事，也许第一次让观众对“法医鉴定语言学”产生了信心。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　连环爆炸的目的何在？

上世纪90年代，这名罪犯自己说明制造这些邮包炸弹的动机与图谋，那就是反对工业科技文明对人类自由的伤害。

在寄出邮包炸死平民同时，罪犯还向报纸、学者寄出不少署名为“F.C.”信件，要求正视高度发达的科技文明对于人类自由生活的迫害与剥夺。

其中一封寄给了1993年诺贝尔奖获得者，遗传学家理查·罗伯特和飞利浦·夏普，信中警告两位博士，应该立刻停止他们的基因研究。

还有一封寄给《纽约时报》与《华盛顿邮报》，要求发表他长达35000字的《工业社会及其未来》宣言，否则就要炸掉一架民航客机。

权衡再三之后，美国司法部与联邦调查局违背了“不向恐怖分子妥协”的原则，允许这份宣言的最终公开发表

有人认为，这份“诅咒着高科技环境下现代社会的不自由，工业革命带来的人类灾难、社会的动荡、生命意义的消失”的宣言不过是陈词滥调，但在“探索”频道电视剧集执行制片人安德鲁·索德罗斯基（Andrew Sodroski）眼里，却是一份“先知般的预言”。

“这份宣言中所描绘人与科技关系比20年前还要符合现状。

在智能手机普及之前，宣言已经告诉我们，人类生活将如何被科技所绑架、所胁迫，所约束、所决定。

当手机响起时，你就必须接听，不管你是不是正在和一个活生生的人对话，不管你是不是认为这事愚蠢而且无关紧要。

” 美国媒体报导这部剧集时这写道“在《炸弹追凶》发布会现场，许多人将听到、看到的信息输入笔记本、平板电脑或手机之中，再通过社交媒体成千上万地传播扩散到世界各地。

推特是在《宣言》公布十几后才出现的。

然而，这一场景却证明了《宣言》的准确性，即对科技的依赖将主宰人类的日常生活”

2007年中国《新周刊》杂志报导指出，美国阳光微系统公司的首席科学家比利乔伊，曾在《连线》杂志上撰文《为什么未来不需要我们》，他在文中大量援引《宣言》中的段落以此说明科技的危险。

遭到“校航炸弹客”重伤的耶鲁大学计算机科学教授大卫·加勒特也承认，《宣言》推断不无道理，工业文明时代，人类的未来，也许真的险恶重重。

在“911”前，美国国内的恐怖主义活动的主题并非只是 “文明的冲突”，反对工业文明也是恐怖活动的主题之一，包括环保运动、反对堕胎、动物权利保护等等。

一份1998年的美国报纸写道，“ 为了拯救环境而不断升级的破坏行动席卷了美国西部，已经造成了数千万美元的损失并使人们的生命处于危险之中；自1980年以来，至少有100起此类暴力事件发生，造成了4280万美元的经济损失。

进入21世纪之后，反对工业文明仍然是恐怖主义意识形态源泉之一。

”2011年7月，32岁的白人男性安德斯·贝林·布雷维克在挪威首都奥斯陆发动恐怖袭击，先是在政府办公区引爆炸弹，炸死了8人；再是前往度假小岛，枪杀了69名参加暑期夏令营的青少年。

这名“独狼式”恐怖主义杀手在网上发布的袭击宣言，很大一部分内容抄袭自1995年的“校航炸弹客”的《工业社会及其未来》。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　谁造就连环杀手？

这名拥有如此精巧高超的爆炸手法，怀抱如此“崇高伟大”人生理想的罪犯，是毕业于哈佛大学的数学天才――泰德·卡辛斯基（Ted Kaczynski）。

1942年5月22日，卡辛斯基出生于伊利诺伊州，智商高达167，16岁被哈佛大学数学系录取，20多岁在密歇根大学用了几个月的时间就获得数学博士学位，因为他解决了导师也没有解决的数学难题，“他的博士论文全美国只有10-12个人能看懂”。

有些观点认为，尽管这位数学天才自幼内向、害羞、不爱与人交流，但并不存在心理疾病，也没有反社会人格，无论是他的高中老师们，还是哈佛当年的新生体检医生，都将他描述为一个正常的孩子。

但是，卡辛斯基在哈佛求学时期参与一项心理学试验则可能对他的心理状态与人生信仰产生了巨大冲击，最终导致他变成一名连环杀手。

这段经历在美国媒体相关报导中鲜有提及，“探索”频道的电视剧集再现了这一过程，让观众们了解美帝国主义的一段极不为光彩的人权污点。

冷战时期，哈佛大学心理学教授亨利·默里（Henry Murray）在美国中央情报局的援助下主持一个“精神控制”实验项目，卡辛斯基与他的同学们在没有被告知的情况下成为了实验对象，测试人们在极端压力下的心理反应，企图以此建立一套从心理上摧毁苏联间谍政治信仰的心理战审讯方法。

“ 默里让他的不知情的学生，接受了密集的审讯。

他自己称之为‘激烈的，全面的，辱骂性’的个人攻击，攻击他的学生们的自尊心和最珍视的理想和信仰”“ 被测试的学生进入了地下室，来自内心的声音命令自己必须遵守一切规则。

他发现地下室里有一盏足以使人失明的聚光灯对着门口，房间其它部分则陷入一片漆黑，一个讯问者坐在当中，几乎无法被看见。

讯问者粗暴地命令他坐下。

当他坐下时，他发现椅子被放置得如此精确，以至于聚光灯的全部光亮都集中照射在自己的脸庞上” 这个将学生当作为科学服务的“小白鼠”实验，也许直接导致卡辛斯基高度认同“科技和科学正在破坏自由和自然”的命题。

但是，与此同时，卡辛斯基也变成了另一个亨利·默里，将所谓的理想原则凌驾于普通人性之上。

为一种理念、为了一个原则，为了一种信仰可以牺牲掉无数普通人的性命，这就是卡辛斯基对其炸弹谋杀行为进行合理化的内动力所在。

卡钦斯基的扮演者――Paul Bettany，明确地重申电视剧集绝不是为了同情卡钦斯基，但它确实试图引起你的同情。

“Ted有一部分是孩子，16岁被中央情报局(CIA)做实验，被羞辱，这对任何人来说都是件可怕的事情。

这在某种程度上摧毁了他，并以某种方式将他武器化。

”Bettany说，这是一个非常有趣的问题，为什么现在孩子，不仅在美国，还包括英国乃至欧洲，对自己的国家觉得如此疏远以至于要跑到叙利亚去？

我们如何帮助那些内心深处觉得如此疏离以至于觉得自己不再是社会一分子的人？

强大演员阵容这部美剧演员阵容强大，都是赏心悦目、正当壮年、风度迷人的老戏骨真男人，可谓是色艺俱佳。

,包括来自电影《阿凡达》的Sam Worthington，来自电影《温布尔登》Paul Bettan——来自美剧《欲望都市》、《傲骨贤妻》的Chris Noth美剧《欢乐合唱团》的恶魔老师Jane Lynch，仅有短短几分钟的出镜却是让人印象深刻，饰演有担当、有魄力的美国首位女性司法部长Janet Reno。

另外，对于在体制内混迹多年的公务人员来说，这部剧集也会深深引起共鸣……在官僚体制内，想要与时俱进、实事求是，做一些前所未有的尝试与努力，将是多么的困难！！！

参考资料Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber，the AtlanticDiscovery’s “Manhunt Unabomber” Kaczynski as a true, heartless prophet，Salon.com“Manhunt Unabomber” explores the life of murderer Ted Kaczynski ， Fox News

所有人都是固执己见的，他们都认为自己正确而别人错误，但是区别在于结果，如果你固执己见得到了正确答案，你就会被认为是聪明的，是先进的，反之则是落后。

就比如男主的上司们，他们执着于他们的想法，他们的经验，觉得男主就是毛头小子，想要自尊。

男主呢，就是憋着一股气，我就是能抓到，要你们看看我有多正确，这不是坚持着他自己的想法吗？

固执己见说明自己对自己想法的确幸，其实反过来，如果不固执己见，被别人说说就动摇，那也不是好事，更显得没个性、没主见。

这是个中性词在我眼中。

不好把握的是一个度。

所有人也都渴望他人认可，认为自己独一无二，认为自己比其他人都聪明，认为他人都不理解自己。

所有人都愿意为了自己的固执己见和自以为特别而付出努力。

而一切是非功过，就看结果是否正确而已。

程序正义，结果正义，那个人就一定正义吗？

男主在这个过程中可谓是不择手段啊。

你说为什么那些律师要替那些杀人犯辩护呢，因为在与他们接触的过程中，发现对方也是一个人，而不是报纸上那些冷冰冰的形容词，他所做的一切都是有理由的。

当然同时这也是律师的责任。

在表面上，我们应该喜欢男主这个捉到杀人犯的英雄，而希望杀人犯死去，但看完以后呢，对于泰德有了同情怜悯之心，不知道其他人，男主是有点找我讨厌的，那种一意孤行、利用完即丢，还有很隐藏的媚上欺下，他不敢对着上司怎么骂，哪怕心理怨恨呢，哪怕上司抢了他的功呢，他都能忍，其实这个时候上司肯定是要补偿一下的，哪怕升个职呢，手中有把柄又不用，美国媒体那么发达，连个威胁都不敢吗？

对于帮助过自己的，一副你违规帮了我，你就活该，谁让你违规呢的样子。

这种人最开始你不了解，知道他是这种人以后也没有人敢帮他，因为你知道他还会落井下石。

所以啊，远远的看一个人，只会看见加诸于他身上的光环或者标签，沦为片面化。

不要轻易来评价一个你不认识的人，除非你生活在他身边。

但是，离得近，就一定了解他吗？

泰德的弟弟，母亲，还有那些邻居，谁了解他？

知心好友，多难得。

知人知面还是不知心最常见。